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ABSTRACT
Scholars have lavished attention on the substance of jurisdictional
doctrines such as standing, mootness, diversity, and federal question.
They have left largely unexamined, however, the procedures courts
use to address these doctrines; collectively, I refer to these procedures
as “jurisdictional procedure.” A paramount feature of jurisdictional
procedure is the unique and virtually unqualified obligation federal
courts possess to identify and decide issues of subject matter
jurisdiction even if the parties and lower courts overlook these issues.
Courts have reached no consensus about how to identify the facts
necessary to effectuate this obligation. The confluence of court-
initiated legal inquiry and unpredictable factual investigation has
profound consequences for the administration of justice. 
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The courts’ duty to inquire into jurisdiction departs dramatically
from the adversarial norms that dominate the American legal
system. This departure, however, is necessary to preserve separation
of powers. As judicial review and judicial supremacy have gained
acceptance, courts have transcended the system of checks and
balances through which the Constitution seeks to constrain federal
power. In the absence of external checks on judicial authority, self-
applied jurisdictional limitations, effectuated through an inquisito-
rial procedure nested within our adversarial system, fill a crucial
role. 
In inquiring into jurisdiction, courts often require parties to have
developed the facts related to jurisdiction in the district court, even
if the jurisdictional issue was not identified during that stage of the
litigation. This marriage of traditional adversarial rules allocating
responsibility to parties and the largely inquisitorial duty of courts
to inquire into jurisdiction creates several problems. First, plaintiffs
unfairly have their cases dismissed without the opportunity to
provide facts related to newly arising jurisdictional concerns.
Second, judicial resources go to waste because in some circumstances
plaintiffs can file new claims that will require entirely new judicial
proceedings. Third, courts inaccurately dismiss cases in circum-
stances in which jurisdiction would plainly exist if the court
considered a completed factual record.
Courts can remain true to separation of powers principles while
avoiding the pitfalls that often arise out of current jurisdictional
procedure. To do so, they should investigate the facts necessary to
correctly assess their jurisdiction. A duty to investigate jurisdictional
facts would enable courts to balance their obligations to act when
they have jurisdiction and to dismiss when they do not. It would
more fully vindicate separation of powers. And, ultimately, it would
create a fairer, more efficient, and more accurate legal process.
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INTRODUCTION
Early in the Republic, the Supreme Court explained, “Jurisdiction
is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only
function remaining to the court is that of announcing th[at] fact and
dismissing the cause.”1 To carry out that function, federal courts
have developed a host of doctrines delineating the metes and bounds
of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs must have standing,2 cases
must be ripe,3 and parties must be fully diverse or present federal
questions.4 
Despite the foundational nature and profound consequences of
these doctrines, the process by which courts determine whether they
have jurisdiction remains sorely underexamined. Ongoing debates
about the substance of jurisdictional doctrines—such as standing,
mootness, diversity, and federal question—have obscured persistent
issues with what I refer to as “jurisdictional procedure”: the
procedure that courts use to decide questions of jurisdiction.5 Most
critically, there is no consensus regarding the proper way for courts
to adjudicate the facts on which jurisdiction depends. 
Consider these examples. In Heartwood, Inc. v. Agpaoa, a panel
of the Sixth Circuit raised standing at oral argument, asking
whether the district court record contained evidence that the
1. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868).
2. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-62 (1992).
3. See Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08 (2003).
4. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332 (2006).
5. That is not to say that all corners of jurisdictional procedure have been ignored. For
example, Kevin Clermont and others have written about the sequencing of jurisdictional and
nonjurisdictional threshold issues, see, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for
Judicial Decisionmaking: Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion,
63 FLA. L. REV. 301 (2011), Amy Wildermuth and Lincoln Davies have considered appropriate
procedures for developing a factual record related to standing to bring petitions for review,
see Amy J. Wildermuth & Lincoln L. Davies, Standing, on Appeal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 957,
999-1011, and Scott Dodson has examined the incorporation of nonjurisdictional procedural
rules, like rules of evidence and proof, see Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF.
L. REV. 1439, 1466-70 (2011). All of these procedural rules relate to one another because they
govern courts’ resolution of jurisdiction. This Article suggests that jurisdictional procedure
should be recognized as a distinct field of inquiry and, moreover, that much of its idiosyncrasy
flows from the rule that courts bear the responsibility to identify and decide jurisdictional
questions even absent any involvement by the parties.
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environmental-organization plaintiffs had members who used the
precise corner of a national forest slated for timber harvest.6 Neither
the government defendant nor the district court had ever questioned
standing.7 Nonetheless, based solely on the state of the record at the
time of final judgment in the district court, the Sixth Circuit ordered
the case dismissed.8 In America’s Best Inns, Inc. v. Best Inns of
Abilene, L.P., the Seventh Circuit noticed that the district court
record lacked evidence of citizenship of each partner in a limited
partnership.9 The court required the parties to “enlarge the record”
so that the court could assess the existence of diversity juris-
diction.10 After considering affidavits filed after oral argument, the
court dismissed.11 And in Bartee v. Reed, the Fifth Circuit consid-
ered a death-row prisoner’s claim that the prosecution had not con-
ducted court-ordered DNA testing and the prosecution’s argument
that the testing was underway.12 Without prompting from the
parties, the court explained that the case may have become moot
and remanded to the district court because “the mootness determi-
nation depends on record development that does not commonly take
place in appellate courts.”13 
We thus have three courts, three decisions related to subject
matter jurisdiction, and three different approaches that may result
in different outcomes. Note, however, a striking similarity. All three
courts of appeals raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua
sponte. 
That may sound blindingly obvious. The courts raised the
question of jurisdiction on their own because subject matter juris-
diction is so fundamental a limitation on the authority of courts
that, as the Supreme Court has explained, courts “are not of course
precluded from reexamining ... jurisdiction ... merely because no
challenge was made by the parties.”14 Indeed, courts have an
6. 628 F.3d 261, 267-68 (6th Cir. 2010).
7. See id. at 266-67 (noting that the district court never addressed plaintiff ’s showing of
standing).
8. Id. at 268-69.
9. 980 F.2d 1072, 1073 (7th Cir. 1992).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1073-74.
12. No. 12-70012, 2012 WL 1933560, at *1 (5th Cir. May 29, 2012).
13. Id.
14. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 16 (1963)
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“independent obligation to assure [them]selves that jurisdiction is
proper,”15 an obligation that I refer to as “the duty of jurisdictional
inquiry.” 
Jurisdictional procedure has largely escaped consideration.16 Yet
it diverges significantly from the ordinary course of business in
federal courts. The American legal system is perhaps the most
avowedly adversarial system of law in history.17 It is an article of
faith that the presentation of facts and legal issues by opposing
sides in a case is the best way to divine truth, respect autonomy,
and secure justice.18 Courts do occasionally deviate from the adver-
sarial formula, for example, to apply the “right body of law” even
when it has not been articulated properly by the parties.19 But these
deviations are exceptional.20
The opposite is true of jurisdictional procedure. Courts have an
unflagging obligation to raise and resolve questions of jurisdiction.21
In so doing, they take on an active role in litigation that bears a
striking resemblance to the role assumed by courts from inquisito-
rial traditions.22 
(emphasis added); see also North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971).
15. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 324 (2008).
16. For a discussion of the reasons that jurisdictional procedure has largely escaped the
notice of courts and commentators, see Justin R. Pidot, The Invisibility of Jurisdictional
Procedure and Its Consequences, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1405, 1411-17 (2012). 
17. See, e.g., Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due
Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1183-
85 (2005).
18. See, e.g., 3 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1395, at 94, 96-97 (2d ed. 1923).
19. See, e.g., Smith v. Mallick, 514 F.3d 48, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Mwani v. Bin
Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 11 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 2005)); Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings:
When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV 1253,
1255-56 (2002).
20. See Miller, supra note 19, at 1264-68 (discussing the general rule that appellate courts
only consider issues raised by the parties).
21. The full extent of this obligation is not always clear. Parties clearly cannot consent to
jurisdiction. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982). It is possible, however, that parties jointly seeking a federal forum could circumvent
this rule by stipulating to the facts necessary to establish jurisdiction. See Dodson, supra note
5, at 1469-70. 
22. Inquisitorialism is often associated with the civil law system of justice practiced in
much of Europe, see, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice,
87 GEO. L.J. 1983, 2005-09 (1999) (discussing the inquisitorial systems of Germany and
France); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Appellate Courts and Independent Experts, 60 CASE W. RES.
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Courts approach jurisdictional facts, however, based on diverging
and unspoken assumptions about the nature of jurisdiction.
Different treatment of jurisdictional facts transcends substantive
doctrines. With respect to standing, for example, courts most often
adhere to the Heartwood model and raise and resolve questions of
standing based on whatever facts happen to be in the district court
record at the time of final judgment.23 But occasionally, courts ex-
pand the record on appeal24 or remand to the district court to allow
further factual development.25 Without any clear pattern, panels
within the same circuit, often without explanation, apply these
different mechanisms to determine their jurisdiction.26
Each approach involves a different mixture of inquisitorial and
adversarial process.27 The duty of jurisdictional inquiry is essen-
L. REV. 303, 314 (2010), even though modern European procedure converges in significant
ways with adversarial rules associated with common law countries. See David A. Sklansky,
Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1640 (2009). Categorizing the nature of the
legal system in civil law countries is unnecessary to this Article’s project. 
23. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. The same diversity of approaches exists
with respect to other jurisdictional doctrines as well. For courts addressing mootness,
compare Coral Springs Street Systems, Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir.
2004) (dismissing as moot upon de novo review), and Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277,
1290 (10th Cir. 2004) (dismissing in part for mootness because plaintiff had died), with
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 315-16, 319-20 (1974) (dismissing as moot based on
answer to question asked at oral argument), and Bankshot Billiards, Inc. v. City of Ocala, 634
F.3d 1340, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2011) (remanding to district court to evaluate mootness). For
courts addressing diversity of citizenship, compare America’s Best Inns, Inc. v. Best Inns of
Abilene, L.P., 980 F.2d 1072, 1073-74 (7th Cir. 1992) (vacating for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because parties failed to establish diversity), with Mullins v. Testamerica Inc., No.
07-10340, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 23446, at *1-8 (5th Cir. Nov. 13, 2008) (remanding to district
court to further develop jurisdictional facts), and Von Dunser v. Aronoff, 915 F.2d 1071, 1072-
76 (6th Cir. 1990) (remanding for determination of diversity). 
24. See, e.g., Ouachita Watch League v. Jacobs, 463 F.3d 1163, 1169-72 (11th Cir. 2006).
The Supreme Court has recently cast some doubt on the viability of appellate fact-finding with
respect to standing. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 495 n.*, 500 (2009).
25. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., No. 06-1714,
2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 2854, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 7, 2008). 
26. Compare id. (remanding for further factual findings), with Benham v. City of
Charlotte, 635 F.3d 129, 134 (4th Cir. 2011) (“If an appellate court determines that the district
court lacked jurisdiction, vacatur of the district court’s ruling, along with a remand with
instructions to dismiss, is the appropriate disposition.”).
27. In a recent article, Scott Dodson provides a provocative analysis of the
nonjurisdictional doctrines that infuse the adjudication of jurisdiction. See Dodson, supra note
5. As Dodson explains, jurisdictional doctrines are often “hybridized” with nonjurisdictional
rules and procedures. See id. at 1439. Dodson contends that this hybridity indicates greater
commonality between the jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional. See id. at 1448-50. He is no
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tially inquisitorial insofar as it obliges judges to play an active role
in litigation. Courts, however, adjudicate jurisdictional facts along
a spectrum. When courts leave the development of jurisdictional
facts to the parties, they rely more heavily on adversarial norms,
and when courts inquire into those facts themselves, they rely more
heavily on inquisitorial norms. 
These choices matter to case outcomes. The facts in Heartwood
strongly suggest that the organization could have satisfied the
standing test articulated by the Sixth Circuit had the court either
requested additional information or remanded for further fact-
finding: the case involved a plan to commercially harvest 4,845
acres of the 706,000 acre Daniel Boone National Forest; the efforts
of Kentucky Heartwood, one of the plaintiff organizations, focused
on that national forest; and the organization had over 200
members.28 This means that had the Heartwood court chosen to
expand the record or remand for further fact-finding, the case would
likely not have been dismissed. 
Courts and commentators have failed to identify an appropriate
uniform approach to jurisdictional procedure, explain its theoretical
underpinnings, or even consider its importance. This is all the more
striking because jurisdictional procedure serves as a backdrop to
many of the great debates over the substantive dimensions of
jurisdictional doctrines. For example, Justice Scalia has advanced
provocative arguments that rigid and strict standing requirements
serve vital separation of powers principles by keeping courts from
encroaching on the territory of the political branches of govern-
ment.29 Cass Sunstein, on the other hand, has rejoined that this
view of standing “should not be accepted by judges who are sincerely
committed to the original understanding of the Constitution and to
doubt correct that jurisdiction is less distinct than commonly conceived. This Article suggests,
however, that jurisdictional procedure stands on different footing, incorporating rules and
practices that diverge more drastically from those that prevail outside of the jurisdictional
context than is commonly recognized. 
28. See Heartwood, Inc. v. Myers, 628 F.3d 261, 265 (6th Cir. 2010); Complaint ¶ 5,
Heartwood, Inc. v. Myers, 611 F. Supp. 2d 675 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (No. 5:07-cv-114); About
Kentucky Heartwood, CAUSES.COM, http://www.causes.com/causes/103428-kentucky-
heartwood/about (last visited Sept. 26, 2012); About, KY. HEARTWOOD, http://www.
kyheartwood.org/about.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2012).
29. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).
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judicial restraint.”30 This debate over the scope of standing necessar-
ily implicates jurisdictional procedure because, absent the duty of
courts to raise standing sua sponte, the doctrine could not serve the
gatekeeping role envisioned by Scalia and critiqued by Sunstein. 
Consider also the claim that appellate courts invoke standing on
ideological grounds to avoid deciding cases that particular judges do
not like. In a study of Supreme Court and appellate court standing
decisions, Richard Pierce, Jr. found a strong correlation between the
votes of judges and their political affiliation.31 Standing provides a
tempting target for judges seeking to avoid deciding the merits of
cases in a manner counter to their preferences because jurisdic-
tional procedure permits the court to raise the issue at any time and
allows courts of appeals to direct the dismissal of cases based on the
facts contained in the existing district court record. 
Like the substance of jurisdictional doctrines, jurisdictional
procedure raises profound questions about the role of courts in
American society and the burdens placed on parties seeking justice,
including: Do the principles supporting jurisdictional procedure
justify its radical departure from the ordinary adversarial process?
Does the distinctly un-adversarial premise that courts, and not
parties, bear the responsibility for raising issues of jurisdiction have
ramifications for the procedures courts use to carry out the duty of
jurisdictional inquiry? And, if jurisdictional procedure imposes costs
on parties, courts, or the public, can reform avoid or reduce these
costs?
30. Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 166 (1992). See generally, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Standing
and Mootness Decisions in the Wake of Laidlaw, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 183 (2003); Daniel A.
Farber, A Place-Based Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1505 (2008); Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2002); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741 (1999). Erwin Chemerinsky
recently called adoption of increasingly stringent jurisdictional requirements “one of the most
pernicious aspects of the conservative assault on the Constitution.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE
CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION 201 (2010); see id. at 211-15 (discussing
standing). These commentators, Chemerinsky included, do not question that courts should
be in the business of policing their own jurisdiction.
31. See Pierce, supra note 30, at 1754-55, 1759-60; see also Madeline Fleisher, Judicial
Decision Making Under the Microscope: Moving Beyond Politics Versus Precedent, 60 RUTGERS
L. REV. 919, 924 (2008) (finding a similar result); Nichol, supra note 30, at 326 (“[T]he
rationale for access to the courthouse likely lies in ideology.”).
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To answer those questions, this Article proceeds in four parts.
Part I locates jurisdictional procedure and, specifically, the duty of
jurisdictional inquiry that it imposes on courts within the consti-
tutional order of the federal government. Good reasons exist for
requiring courts to inquire into their jurisdiction. Courts must police
their own authority because no other branch of government can
effectively check its scope. Unlike the executive and legislative
branches, the federal judiciary faces few external checks. The courts
therefore properly exercise restraint to avoid overstepping their
constitutional role, vindicating separation of powers principles and
maintaining legitimacy. Although the federal courts have not
characterized the duty of jurisdictional inquiry in precisely these
terms, the explanation presented in this Article makes sense of
significant changes that have occurred in jurisdictional procedure
over the history of the American Republic. 
Part II provides theoretical consideration of the two legal theories
—adversarialism and inquisitorialism—that contribute to jurisdic-
tional procedure. The American adversarial system is often favor-
ably contrasted with inquisitorialism. This cultural hostility creates
obstacles to legal reform drawing on inquisitorial theory. Yet the
present system uncontroversially incorporates a number of inquisi-
torial features. As other legal scholars have suggested, acknowledg-
ing the existing hybridity of the American legal system may reduce
unfounded objections to using procedures that redress existing
problems.32
Part III turns to jurisdictional facts. It begins by identifying
situations in which questions of jurisdiction most often turn on
jurisdictional facts. The environmental context provides a good
illustration because the standing of environmental plaintiffs often
requires courts to consider facts altogether unrelated to the merits
of the relevant legal claims and, in some circumstances, requires
courts to resolve scientific disputes. Climate change litigation, for
example, brings this problem to the fore. 
Part III then identifies problems caused by the currently
predominant practice in which appellate courts raise and resolve
jurisdictional issues based on whatever facts happen to have been
32. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 17, at 1183-85.
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in the district court record at the time of final judgment, even if no
question of jurisdiction had been raised at that time, and even after
years of litigation and the expenditure of significant resources. In so
doing, courts dismiss cases based on an incomplete factual record.
That leads to problems: It risks unfairly penalizing plaintiffs for a
district court’s error in failing to accurately assess jurisdiction. It
leads to arbitrary results when certain plaintiffs may file new
claims and others may not, based simply on how long it takes the
federal courts to dismiss and whether the statute of limitations has
run in the interim. It risks wasting judicial resources. And it results
in courts failing to exercise the full extent of their constitutional
authority.
Part IV begins with a brief return to the separation of powers
principles that animate jurisdictional procedure and explains that,
properly understood, the system of checks and balances that the
duty of jurisdictional inquiry substitutes for both provides a mech-
anism to prevent overreaching, and also a means of correcting
underimplementation of constitutional duties. Just as courts draw
on inquisitorial tradition to internally check their own excesses, by
drawing on the inquisitorial tradition courts can assure themselves
that they fully carry out their constitutional charge. To be clear, this
Article does not suggest that courts exercise an outdated model of
inquisitorial procedure whereby judges call and question witnesses
without notice to parties and outside of their presence. Rather,
courts should act more inquisitorially by recognizing that to best
fulfill the duty of jurisdictional inquiry, they must also assure
themselves that the record contains necessary jurisdictional facts.
In carrying out that obligation, courts should act in concert with the
parties, but the ultimate responsibility for developing the record
should rest with the courts, and most appropriately, district courts.
This reform will not only more perfectly vindicate separation of
powers but will also address persistent problems with current
practice. 
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    I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF JURISDICTIONAL  
PROCEDURE
This Section examines the role of courts in the constitutional
separation of powers and details the co-evolution of judicial power
and jurisdictional procedure. This historical and theoretical
grounding illuminates the reasons that jurisdictional procedure has
evolved to require courts to assess jurisdiction even when the par-
ties remain silent. Separation of powers principles provide a strong
justification for the unique dimensions of jurisdictional procedure,
suggesting that, despite its potential costs, courts should continue
to carry out the duty of jurisdictional inquiry. A need to advance
those principles will, therefore, inform the possible avenues for
reform discussed in Part IV.
A. Checks, Spurs, and Courts in Constitutional Design
The principle of separation of powers undergirds the structure
of the federal government established by the Constitution. The
Framers viewed “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, exec-
utive, and judiciary, in the same hands ... [as] the very definition of
tyranny.”33 To prevent aggrandizement of power, the Constitution
confers three types of governmental power on three different
branches, and simultaneously creates external restraints—often
referred to as checks and balances—to assure that the institutions
do not overstep their authority.34 Or, at least, that is the received
version of constitutional theory. 
In reality, the Constitutional Convention lavished attention on
the legislative and executive branches and considered the judiciary
as an afterthought.35 The Constitution reflects this history, creating
33. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
34. See M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1127, 1132 (2000); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison); Richard A. Brisbin,
Jr., The Judiciary and the Separation of Powers, in THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 89, 89-90 (Kermit
L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2005).
35. See William E. Nelson, The Historical Foundations of the American Judiciary, in THE
JUDICIAL BRANCH, supra note 34, at 3-4.  Each article of the Constitution vests the legis-
lative, executive, and judicial power in Congress, the President, and the federal courts,
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intricate checks on Congress and the President without creating
similarly robust structures to limit judicial authority. 
In support of this point, consider the following thought experi-
ment. Judges, lawyers, and academics have long viewed advisory
opinions as beyond the scope of the federal judiciary.36 But what if
the Supreme Court issued a decision tomorrow deciding otherwise?
What if the Court announced that from here on out any person could
ask the federal judiciary to decide questions about the interpreta-
tion of the Constitution, statutes, regulations, or the common law
—or even about public policy—and the federal courts could defini-
tively answer those questions because “[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is”?37 Congress and the President would surely react with outrage.
Perhaps they would pass a law purporting to strip the federal courts
of this new power, a law which the federal courts could then hold
unconstitutional. The point is that the Constitution as currently
understood provides no obvious and effective mechanism for the
other branches to stop the Court’s excess. 
The most obvious checks the Constitution provides to Congress
and the President are negative in nature. Each branch has tools to
respectively. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, art. II, § 1, art. III, § 1. Article I, Sections 8 and 9
provide elaborate specification of the legislative power provided to Congress, identifying
numerous spheres of authority and restraints. Id. art. I, §§ 8-9. Article II, Sections 2 and 3
provide similar specifications for the executive power. Id. art II, §§ 2-3. Article III, by contrast,
provides little explication of the “judicial power.” Id. art. III. Article III, Section 2 identifies
those “Cases” and “Controversies” that fall within the original jurisdiction of the federal
courts, but does not define judicial power. Id. art. III, § 2.
36. See, e.g., Note, Advisory Opinions and the Influence of the Supreme Court over
American Policymaking, 124 HARV. L. REV. 2064, 2064-66 (2011). This assumption about the
nature of courts runs deep. For example, Alexander Bickel described the respective roles of
the judicial and legislative branches by asserting that “[t]he courts are concerned with the
flesh and blood of an actual case.” ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 26
(2d ed. 1986); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95-97 (1968) (discussing what makes an
issue justiciable). This is surely true as a description of the practice of federal courts, but
nothing in the Constitution’s text necessarily limits the courts to such cases. Indeed, Article
III vests the courts with jurisdiction not only over certain types of cases but also over
categories of controversies, a distinction that easily could have been interpreted as vesting the
courts with broad authority in certain situations.
37. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Some state constitutions
empower state courts to issue advisory opinions, and the Supreme Court of Minnesota
assumed that power for itself without an obvious constitutional or statutory source. See Helen
Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1845-46 (2001).
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stop the other from exercising extraconstitutional authority. The
nature of the relationship between the political branches, however,
also gives rise to additional mechanisms that allow the President
and Congress to spur each other to exercise the constitutional
authority they each possess.38 
Consider the explicit tools that the Constitution provides each
political branch to restrain the other: The President can veto legis-
lation that Congress passes, and Congress, through the Senate,
has a parallel opportunity to reject the President’s choice of
leaders for the executive branch and must ratify any treaties the
President negotiates.39 Congress funds the executive branch, and
the President enforces the laws that Congress passes.40 And the
Constitution divides authority over the war power between the
President and Congress; although the President serves as the
Commander in Chief of the armed forces, only Congress can declare
war.41
Congress and the President also possess tools implicit in the
constitutional structure to spur each other to action.42 For example,
38. See Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in
an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 354, 359-67 (2011) (explaining that
governmental actors can perform their roles in a way that signals other institutional actors
through a system of “prods and pleas”).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, art. II, § 2.
40. Id. art. I, § 7, art. II, § 1.
41. Id. art I, § 8, art. II, § 2. A modern critique suggests that the constitutional order has
broken down because Congress has become unable or unwilling to carry out its assigned
tasks, thereby paving the way to either a complete breakdown of government or the rise of an
imperial presidency. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010). The problems ascribed to Congress have little to do with
separation of powers itself. Instead, that problem arises out of trends in American politics and
congressional rules that make nonaction an appealing and successful strategy for members
of Congress more interested in reelection than good public policy.
42. See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 38, at 361-62. In policing the separation of powers, the
courts serve both as checks and spurs. For example, when the Court struck down the line item
veto in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1998), it not only prevented
aggrandizement of power in the executive branch but concomitantly spurred Congress to fully
carry out its legislative function. Nonetheless, opportunities for courts to spur, or be spurred
by, the executive branch and legislative branch appear rare because there are few formal
channels of communication to guide such interaction and little informal communication
between the judiciary and the other branches occurs due to concerns about propriety. See
Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Renewing the Relationship, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
279, 279-83 (1991) (contrasting perceived constitutional limits on interbranch communication
between the political branches and with the judiciary).
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the Vice President serves as the president of the Senate, providing
the executive branch with direct means to influence congressional
activity.43 The President also routinely prepares legislation for
Congress and possesses substantial leverage to pressure Congress
to take action on pressing national problems. Congress has comple-
mentary powers to pressure agencies to comply with their duties by
holding oversight hearings or exercising power over appropria-
tions.44 Additionally, through the Administrative Procedure Act,
Congress provides a right of action to aggrieved individuals should
administrative agencies fail to execute the law.45 
Whereas the Constitution imposes a complex scheme to govern
the relationship between Congress and the President, it primarily
concerns itself with insulating the federal judiciary from outside
influence.46 The President, acting in concert with the Senate, selects
judges.47 Once selected, however, judges may remain in office for
life.48 Article III also prohibits any reduction in judicial compensa-
tion, which prevents Congress from directly influencing judges
through its power over the purse.49 The power to appoint judges may
have seemed a potent form of control in the eighteenth century,
when it was presumed that life tenure would rarely last very long.50
As life expectancy increased, Supreme Court appointments became
rarer, diminishing the ability of the political branches to control the
Supreme Court through appointments.51 
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
44. See id. art. I, § 9.
45. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006).
46. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and
Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 729-30 (1995); see also Larry D. Kramer, “The
Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism, and the Theory of
Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 705 (2006) (discussing how Madison viewed
the judiciary as too weak to play a meaningful role). 
47. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
48. Id. art. III, § 1.
49. Id. This limitation is striking because Congress otherwise exercises virtually
unfettered authority over federal spending.
50. See Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1315-16
(2007).
51. See id. at 1316, 1321; see also John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent
Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 383 (1999) (explaining
how low turnover on the bench and a respect for stability and predictability make legal
doctrine evolve slowly).
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The Constitution does permit impeachment of judges for “high
Crimes and Misdemeanors.”52 But this power is limited because the
terms “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” suggest that Congress can
remove judges for personal failings, rather than for the performance
of official duties. 
History confirms that reading of the Impeachment Clause. On
only one occasion has Congress considered removing a member of
the federal judiciary based on legal philosophy.53 In 1804, the House
of Representatives served Justice Samuel Chase with eight articles
of impeachment.54 Congress’s chief complaint was that Justice
Chase, an avowed Federalist, had severely criticized the Republican
administration while issuing a jury charge and had eagerly overseen
the sedition prosecution of certain Republican operatives.55 Justice
Chase conceded that his remarks may have been ill-considered, but
contended that judges may properly incorporate political values
into the conduct of their official duties.56 The floor managers for the
House of Representatives argued that the Impeachment Clause
permitted Congress to remove a judge from office based on a fun-
damental disagreement about the law and the proper role of the
judiciary.57 The Senate, however, declined to convict, and Congress
has never again attempted to exercise its impeachment power as a
check on the judiciary’s official conduct.58
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. Article II, Section 4 provides for impeachment of “all Civil
Officers of the United States,” and the Constitution vests that power in the House of
Representatives and the Senate. Id. art. I, §§ 2-3, art. II, § 4. Article III, Section 1 also
provides that “Judges ... shall hold their Offices during good Behavior.” Id. art. III, § 1.
Arguably, the Good Behavior Clause could provide an alternative authority for the removal
of federal judges. See Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal
Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72, 88-89 (2006). Neither the courts nor Congress have embraced this
reading of the impeachment power. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Response: Good Behavior,
Judicial Independence, and the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 116 YALE L.J.
139, 140 (2006); Keith E. Whittington, Reconstructing the Federal Judiciary: The Chase
Impeachment and the Constitution, 9 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 55, 76-82, 102 (1995).
53. See Redish, supra note 52, at 150; see also Whittington, supra note 52, at 55-56 (noting
that the impeachment of Justice Chase was purely political).
54. 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 85-88 (1804).
55. Id.
56. See id. at 116.
57. See id. at 592-96.
58. See Redish, supra note 52, at 150; see also William H. Rehnquist, The American
Constitutional Experience: Remarks of the Chief Justice, 54 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1167 (1994)
(noting that ever since the failed attempt to impeach Justice Chase “a judge’s judicial acts
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Just as Congress and the President have implicit power to
influence one another, so too is it possible that the political branches
possess implicit mechanisms to prevent courts from usurping un-
constitutional power, or to encourage—or force—courts to fulfill
their constitutional role. In limited circumstances, the political
branches have spurred judicial action. For example, the Civil
Justice Reform Act requires the judiciary to report to Congress any
motion that remains undecided for more than six months, and there
is some evidence that this public disclosure has resulted in swifter
decisions.59 The courts, however, have generally resisted efforts by
the political branches to more expansively adjudicate disputes,
viewing separation of powers as “establishing high walls and clear
distinctions” that limit the power of the political branches over the
courts.60 These “high walls” significantly limit the ability of the
may not serve as the basis for impeachment”). Congress could attempt to alter the standard
for impeachment and attempt to remove judges from office based on their judicial acts. See,
e.g., Ferejohn, supra note 51, at 358. John Ferejohn has suggested that “[t]he only real
barriers to frequent resort to impeachment are ... political.” Id. I am not so sure. If Congress
attempted to impeach judges as a means of influencing judicial decision making, the Supreme
Court could assert authority to review Congress’s decision, notwithstanding Nixon v. United
States, 506 U.S. 224, 237-38 (1993) (holding that courts cannot review the impeachment of a
federal officer because that power is reserved for the Senate). 
59. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Adverse Publicity As a Means of Reducing Judicial
Decision-Making Delay: Periodic Disclosure of Pending Motions, Bench Trials and Cases
Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 511, 512-13, 533 (1993). For the view
that the Civil Justice Reform Act unconstitutionally violates separation of powers, see Linda
S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of
Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1295-98 (1993). The Civil Justice Reform Act—with its goal
of increasing the speed with which the judiciary carries out its constitutional obligations—is
somewhat different than the “prods and pleas” discussed by Benjamin Ewing and Douglas
Kysar, which involve one branch engaging in activity to “signal to other institutional actors
that a given problem demands attention and action.” See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 38, at
354. Nonetheless, it involves the political branches implementing a novel tool to shape the
behavior of the judiciary. 
60. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995); see also Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (refusing to entertain lawsuit authorized by citizen suit
provision on standing grounds); Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional
Sources, Alternative Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2593 (1998) (“Article
III judges have asserted the structural authority of Article III against congressional decisions
authorizing decisionmaking by life-tenured judges.”); id. at 2613-15 (discussing judicial
rejection of jurisdiction conferring statutes). The judiciary engages in activity that appears
intended to spur congressional action with more regularity, including concerted lobbying
efforts on issues of particular import to judges. See id. at 2594-95, 2616-27; Tacha, supra note
42, at 282-83.
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executive and legislative branches to ensure that the judiciary fully
carries out its constitutional role. Commentators have identified a
series of possible avenues by which the political branches can check
courts.61 As we shall see, these “checks,” like their action-forcing
counterparts, appear more illusory than substantial.
John Ferejohn and Larry Kramer eloquently argue that the
political branches retain ample authority to check the judiciary.
They identify several tools: Congress’s ability to restrict federal
jurisdiction, manipulate the organization of lower courts, enact
procedural rules to govern judicial proceedings, control the courts’
budgets—apart from judicial salary—and vest administrative
agencies and Article I “courts” with authority to adjudicate certain
types of disputes subject to deferential review in the federal courts.62 
At first blush, this appears a formidable arsenal, and the his-
torical record suggests its potency. Soon after the election of 1800,
for example, the new Republican majority abolished the federal
courts established by the Federalists the previous year, effectively
removing all newly appointed judges from office.63 In 1867, Congress
used an alternative means of restraining the federal judiciary:
eliminating part of its jurisdiction to entertain habeas corpus
petitions.64 And before 1870, Congress varied the size of the
Supreme Court to allow for additional appointments.65 
61. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
62. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 975, 977, 988-91, 998 (2002); see
also Ferejohn, supra note 51, at 382 (noting that the independence of the judiciary depends
on the deference of the popular branches); Judith Resnik, Judicial Independence and Article
III: Too Little and Too Much, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 657, 661, 668 (1999) (using the creation of non-
Article III judges to illustrate how Congress and the judiciary rely on mutual good will to
interact). As courts have become more powerful and required more resources, Congress’s
influence through the budget could arguably have increased as well. Judith Resnik has
explained, “As the judiciary transforms itself ... it is ever more reliant on Congress—for staff,
for surrogate and subsidiary judges, for its very ability to work, let alone to be a player in
[governance].” Id. at 668.
63. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 50, at 1327. In Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299,
306 (1803), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Congress’s abolition of the
federal courts created in the Judiciary Act of 1801.
64. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385; see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868).
65. See Cramton, supra note 50, at 1316 n.12. 
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Times have changed. As a result of three developments, avenues
by which the political branches could once check the judiciary
prove largely ineffective today. First, with the ascendance of judi-
cial supremacy, the courts themselves retain ultimate authority to
interpret any legislation purporting to restrict their authority and
pass upon its constitutionality.66 Consider, for example, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Under the
AEDPA, federal courts have only limited authority to vindicate
constitutional rights in habeas proceedings arising out of state
court.67 Federal courts, however, have the last word on what the
AEDPA means and can decide what limits it places on their
authority.68 More importantly, in Felker v. Turpin, the Supreme
Court had the opportunity to pass on the constitutionality of the
66. This is not a purely theoretical consideration as the courts have actively read
jurisdictional statutes to their own ends. Consider, for example, the Extension of Admiralty
Jurisdiction Act of 1948, which extended admiralty jurisdiction to “all cases of damage or
injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water.” Pub. L. No. 80-695, 62
Stat. 496 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30101 (2006)). Notwithstanding the clear
language of the statute, the Supreme Court interpreted the Act as requiring “that the wrong
bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity” based on its apprehension of
difficulties that arise from a pure locality test. Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,
409 U.S. 249, 267-68 (1972); see also Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity,
97 VA. L. REV. 1, 12 (2011). Barry Friedman has described the development of jurisdiction as
a dialectic between Congress and the courts, see Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The
Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1990), and
demonstrated that in numerous areas, the courts have interpreted jurisdictional grants to
serve their own purposes, rather than in accord with congressional intent, see, e.g., id. at 24
(“Congress’s intent has had little or nothing to do with the Court’s decisions concerning what
constitutes a federal question.”); see also id. at 10-28 (surveying the law of federal jurisdiction
and providing examples of dialogue between Congress and the courts). 
67. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996).
68. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378-79 (2000) (“A construction of the
AEDPA that would require the federal courts to cede [their judicial] authority to the courts
of the States would be inconsistent with ... Article III of the Constitution.”). 
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AEDPA.69 The Court upheld the statute.70 In other words, the
AEDPA limits courts because they have consented to those limita-
tions.71 There likely would not have been any meaningful backlash
if the Court had found the AEDPA unconstitutional, and the same
would hold true for any other law Congress passes to shape or limit
federal jurisdiction.72 
The same could be said for many other limits that might be placed
on federal courts. Since 1948, Congress has entrusted the courts
69. 518 U.S. 651 (1996). Even the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, which would
appear to provide the political branches with the ability to drastically limit judicial authority,
at least for a time, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, is arguably subject to judicial override.
That is because the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as a later enacted portion
of the Constitution, may override any deprivation of due process, even if pursuant to an
otherwise valid suspension of habeas corpus. See Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara,
Habeas Corpus, Due Process and the Suspension Clause: A Study in the Foundations of
American Constitutionalism, 96 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1365 (2010). The courts will have the final
say on how to resolve this conflict.
70. Felker, 518 U.S. at 654. When the judiciary considers the constitutionality of federal
statutes, the political branches may, of course, express their views in the judicial proceeding
either as a party, intervenor, or amicus. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(2) (allowing government
officials to seek permissive intervention in cases involving statutes or regulations related to
their office); FED. R. APP. P. 29(a) (allowing the federal government to file an amicus brief in
any appeal). The final word, however, rests with the courts.
71. Some scholars have argued that the AEDPA simply “push[ed] the courts in a direction
in which they [had] already been moving for purposes of receiving political credit for that
direction.” Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the
Future of the Federal Courts—Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2451
(1998); see also Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The
Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 84-85 (1997). In other words, the courts may have permitted the
AEDPA to stand because Congress was essentially doing what the courts wanted.
72. Academics disagree as to whether Article III’s statement that the federal judicial
power shall be vested “in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish” provides Congress with plenary authority to regulate federal jurisdiction. See
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Friedman, supra note 66, at 3-10. Compare Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-
Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev.
205, 206-07 (1985) (arguing that Article III constrains Congress’s ability to reduce federal
jurisdiction), with Redish, supra note 46, at 713 (contending that Congress has broad power
to limit federal jurisdiction). The Supreme Court has historically permitted Congress to limit
the jurisdiction of lower federal courts, but has appeared less willing to countenance
alteration of its own jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943);
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145-47 (1871); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.)
441, 448-49 (1850). But see Alex Glashausser, A Return to Form for the Exceptions Clause, 51
B.C. L. REV. 1383, 1388-90 (2010) (noting judicial submission to Congress’s encroachment on
the Court’s appellate jurisdiction). 
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with setting their own procedural rules.73 Even though Congress
retains authority to disapprove a rule adopted by the courts, it is the
courts themselves that have ultimate authority to interpret the
rules that exist. For example, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme
Court radically reinterpreted Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to impose a previously unknown pleading requirement.74
Were Congress to repeal the Rules Enabling Act and rewrite the
rules of procedure in a way disapproved of by the courts, it would
not come as any surprise for the courts to achieve their ends
through interpretation or constitutional review.
Litigants have similarly presented federal courts with repeated
opportunities to interpret the statutes authorizing administrative
adjudication and to determine whether they pass constitutional
muster.75 It seems possible, or even likely, that litigants—perhaps
a judge turned plaintiff76—would similarly provide the judiciary
with the opportunity to pass on the constitutionality of a congressio-
nal effort to substantially constrict the budget of the federal
judiciary, depriving judges of judicial clerks, courtrooms, and staff.77 
Second, popular opinion has shifted. The political branches may
have successfully modified the number of Supreme Court justices
prior to 1870, but even a president as popular as Franklin D.
Roosevelt could not accomplish a similar goal in the twentieth
century.78 And Roosevelt’s court-packing plan preceded Cooper v.
73. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006) (originally enacted in 1948).
74. 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965)
(noting that courts measure a federal rule against the standards of the Constitution).
75. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 62, at 660.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980) (holding unconstitutional a statute
eliminating already-provided cost of living adjustments for judicial salaries in a suit brought
by district court judges).
77. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations
of Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 834. But see Redish, supra note 46, at 703
(opining that the Compensation Clause does not protect appropriations related to judicial
support services); Eugenia Froedge Toma, Congressional Influence and the Supreme Court:
The Budget as a Signaling Device, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 131-32, 136, 146 (1991) (finding
that Congress uses the budget to signal its approval or disapproval of the Supreme Court’s
direction). Historically, Congress does not appear to have exercised budgetary control to
influence the courts. See Richard S. Arnold, Money, or the Relations of the Judicial Branch
with the Other Two Branches, Legislative and Executive, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 19, 21-22 (1996).
78. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
315, 322-23 (1999). See generally William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR’s Court-Packing Plan: A
Second Life, a Second Death, 1985 DUKE L.J. 673 (discussing the political opposition to
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Aaron by several decades. It is virtually unthinkable that a
President or Congress could successfully manipulate the size of the
Supreme Court today.79
The story of Newt Gingrich’s bid for the 2012 Republican pres-
idential nomination demonstrates the deep entrenchment of support
for the judiciary. In October 2011, Gingrich released a position
paper attacking the constitutional and historical foundation of
judicial supremacy, leaning heavily on views of judicial limitation
popular in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.80 Drawing
implicitly from popular constitutionalism,81 the paper contends that
“the executive and legislative branches can use their constitutional
powers to take meaningful actions to check and balance any judg-
ments rendered by the judicial branch that they believe to be
unconstitutional,”82 including by reinvigorating the impeachment
power to allow removal of judges based on the substance of their
decisions; requiring judges to justify controversial decisions in
hearings before Congress; abolishing lower federal courts, and even
individual judgeships, that interpret the Constitution differently
than the political branches; and, in some circumstances, simply
ignoring judicial decisions.83 
Across the political spectrum, the response to Gingrich’s proposals
was swift and emphatic. Not surprisingly, liberal media outlets and
politicians bridled at Gingrich’s suggestions.84 But so too did their
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s court-packing plan). 
79. See Burbank, supra note 78, at 324.
80. NEWT GINGRICH, BRINGING THE COURTS BACK UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 2 (Position
paper draft Oct. 7, 2011), available at http://www.newt.org/sites/newt.org/files/Courts.pdf.
81. See Eric Posner, Newt and His Surprising Liberal Allies, SLATE (Dec. 20, 2011, 11:23
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/12/newt_gingrich_
and_the_supreme_court_the_liberal_scholars_who_support_his_critique_on_judicial_supre
macy_.single.html.
82. GINGRICH, supra note 80, at 6.
83. Id. at 20-22.
84. Andrew Cohen, Newt Gingrich and His ‘Rock, Paper, Scissors’ Constitution, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 2011, 4:41 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/12/newt-
gingrich-and-his-rock-paper-scissors-constitution/250152/; Dahlia Lithwick, Courting Disaster,
SLATE (Dec. 19, 2011, 5:27 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
jurisprudence/2011/12/what_logic_could_possibly_be_behind_newt_gingrich_s_crazy_
attacks_on_the_federal_courts_.html; Jamin Raskin, Newt May Be Zany on the Courts, But
Mitt Is Just as Dangerous, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 19, 2011, 12:30 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/jamie-raskin/newt-may-be-zany-on-the-c_b_1154686.html; see also
Editorial, Mr. Gingrich’s Misreading of History, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2011, at A20.
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conservative counterparts.85 Other candidates for the Republican
nomination distanced themselves from Gingrich’s views.86 The
National Review Online ran a series entitled “Gingrich’s Awful
Proposal to Abolish Judgeships.”87 Michael Mukasey, a former attor-
ney general under President George W. Bush, described Gingrich’s
proposals as “dangerous, ridiculous, totally irresponsible, outra-
geous, [and] off-the-wall,” sentiments echoed by Alberto Gonzales,
another attorney general under Bush.88 
Third, judges themselves do not appear to feel constrained by the
machinations of the political branches.89 Consider, for instance, the
writings of Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer, both of
whom have published books about interpreting the Constitution,
and have toured the country together debating their views.90 That
85. See, e.g., EXCLUSIVE: Former Bush Attorneys General Call Gingrich Position on
Courts ‘Dangerous,’ FOX NEWS (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/12/15/
former-bush-attorneys-general-call-gingrich-position-on-courts-dangerous/ [hereinafter FOX
NEWS]. That is not to say that other candidates for the 2012 Republican presidential
nomination embraced the judiciary. A number of the candidates advanced their own more
modest proposals to check judicial power. See, e.g., George F. Will, Op-Ed., How About a
Debate of Substance?, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2011, at A21. 
86. Danny Yadron, Perry, Romney Attack Gingrich Plan on Judges, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19,
2011, 11:49 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/12/19/perry-romney-attack-gingrich-
plan-on-judges/. 
87. Ed Whelan, Gingrich’s Awful Proposal to Abolish Judgeships—Part 1, NAT’L REV.
ONLINE (Dec. 16, 2011, 12:54 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/286013/
gingrich-s-awful-proposal-abolish-judgeships-part-1-ed-whelan; Matthew J. Franck, Gingrich’s
Awful Proposal to Abolish Judgeships—Part 2, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Dec. 16, 2011, 3:09 PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/286040/gingrich-s-awful-proposal-abolish-
judgeships-part-2-matthew-j-franck. Conservative commentator George Will also criticized
Gingrich’s plan. See Will, supra note 85.
88. See FOX NEWS, supra note 85. Former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales explained:
“I cannot support and would not support efforts that would appear to be intimidation or
retaliation against judges.” Id.
89. See Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535,
538 (1999).
90. Dahlia Lithwick, The Steve and Nino Show, SLATE (Oct. 6, 2011, 7:33 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/10/breyer_and_scalia
_unintentionally_make_the_case_for_cameras_in_t.html. An essay by Justice Breyer on
judicial independence does not even mention the sources of limitation identified by Ferejohn
and Kramer. See Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 989 (1996). In a similar vein, Deanell Reece Tacha, while serving as a judge on the
Tenth Circuit and as chairperson of the Committee on the Judicial Branch of the United
States Judicial Conference, examined the relationship between judges and legislators in
depth, calling for increased interbranch communication. See Tacha, supra note 42, at 295.
Judge Tacha expressed a firm conviction that the independence of the judiciary is maintained
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the Justices have taken their show on the road may suggest their
concern about the view the public has of the judiciary. But they
hardly seem concerned that Congress will restrict jurisdiction, re-
duce budgets, or pack courts.91 The Justices do not agree on much,
but they both articulate visions of judicial review that firmly place
the courts at the top of the constitutional pecking order. Instead of
acknowledging a checking role of the other branches, both suggest
that the judiciary must self-regulate. 
B. Evolving Judicial Power 
We have a constitutional order that provides the executive and
legislative branches with the power to check one another, but ro-
bustly protects the independence of the federal judiciary, leaving the
courts as the only branch of the federal government without a
source of external constraint.92 
As a matter of history, this makes some sense. The English
system in place before the Revolutionary War subjected judges to
the overriding authority of the King.93 The Declaration of Independ-
ence complained that the King had “made Judges dependent on his
Will alone, for the Tenure of their Offices, and the Amount and
Payment of their Salaries.”94 The Framers, therefore, had no expe-
rience with a powerful judiciary and instead focused their efforts
through the Constitution’s structure, see id. at 279, and nowhere did she discuss the
techniques identified by Kramer and Ferejohn as constraining judicial independence.
91. Cf. Gordon Bermant & Russell R. Wheeler, Federal Judges and the Judicial Branch:
Their Independence and Accountability, 46 MERCER L. REV. 835, 836 (1995) (considering
evidence of judicial attitudes and concluding that “[f]ederal judges do not now generally
believe that their decisional independence is directly threatened from within or from outside
of the judicial branch”).
92. See Epstein, supra note 77, at 854 (“Because splitting power across separate branches
is the preferred strategy, the Constitution probably is unsound in conferring appointments
of judges during good behavior, effectively for life.”).
93. See Cramton, supra note 50, at 1315; Kermit L. Hall, Judicial Independence and the
Majoritarian Difficulty, in THE JUDICIAL BRANCH, supra note 34, at 60, 68.
94. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776). In his influential
Commentaries on the Laws of England, Lord William Blackstone similarly called for a
judiciary insulated from other branches of government. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 259 (Oxford 1765). Even after the Revolutionary
War, the early Republic experienced troubling encroachments on judicial independence. See
Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the Judicial Branch
in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 35-38 (1998).
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elsewhere: they were concerned that without external constraints,
Congress could run roughshod over the states and prove toxic to
liberty, and that the President could exercise many of the powers of
the monarchy from which the colonies had only recently broken. The
federal judiciary, on the other hand, was the “least dangerous
branch” because it could assert “no influence over either the sword
or the purse.”95 
Moreover, when the Constitution was adopted, the political
branches needed no direct check on the judiciary because the courts
exercised only limited power.96 The dual innovations of judicial
review and judicial supremacy, neither of which Article III ad-
dresses, threaten to upend the tripartite government in favor of
judicial rule.97 As we shall see, even as the courts increased their
authority, they crafted internal checks to protect separation of
powers.
In the earliest days after the ratification of the Constitution, the
federal courts resolved private disputes without clear authority to
test the constitutionality of congressional or executive action. In
1803, the Supreme Court famously asserted the power of judicial
review, determining that aspects of the Judiciary Act of 1801 vio-
lated Article III of the Constitution.98 The power of judicial review,
however, did not encompass the authority to definitively determine
the meaning of the Constitution. As the Court explained, “the
framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument, as a rule
for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature.”99 In other
95. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). As Larry Kramer has noted, the
founding era gave rise to “extraordinarily little discussion about how judicial review would
work or what exactly it would mean in practice. Realistically, though, how could there be?
Judicial review was a novel doctrine, outside the Framers’ actual experience.” Larry D.
Kramer, But When Exactly Was Judicially-Enforced Federalism “Born” in the First Place?, 22
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 123, 125 (1998); see also Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 94, at 48
(noting that the Convention’s failure to protect the judiciary’s structural independence was
the result of their lack of experience and time). 
96. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 77-83, 91-92 (2004); Burbank,
supra note 78, at 323-24.
97. To remedy that problem, some have argued that we abandon judicial review and
judicial supremacy. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 96; MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 163-65 (1999); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case
Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1348, 1353 (2006).
98. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
99. Id. at 179-80 (emphasis omitted). 
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words, the Court exercised authority coordinate with the other
branches to interpret the Constitution. As Larry Kramer has
argued, Marbury v. Madison left intact the ability of Congress and
the President to also interpret the Constitution.100 The decision of
a court would bind the parties before it as to the facts at issue. This
would leave Congress and the President free to adopt their own,
perhaps conflicting, interpretations of the Constitution. Those
conflicts could be resolved only by “the people themselves,” who
constitute the only source of ultimate governmental authority.101 
Even when a controversy raised the constitutionality of legisla-
tion, the early Supreme Court exhibited what would today be an
unthinkable degree of deference to Congress and the President.102
Justices explained that they had authority to declare legislation
void only when it was plainly contrary to the Constitution.103 In
Hylton v. United States, for example, Justice Chase explained that
“[t]he deliberate decision of the National Legislature ... would
determine me, if the case was doubtful, to receive the construction
of the [Constitution by the] Legislature.”104
Over time, deference gave way to suspicion, and by the time of
Lochner v. New York, the Court gave little weight to the views of
100. See KRAMER, supra note 96, at 125-27.
101. Id. at 207-13. Whereas extensive history suggests that the Framers, or at least many
of them, did not view the courts as exercising supreme authority to interpret the Constitution,
evidence indicates that the Framers intended the courts to referee questions about the
separation of powers. For example, Federalist 78 explains that courts would function to keep
the other branches “within the limits assigned to their authority.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78
(Alexander Hamilton). Thus concern about the historical precedent for judicial supremacy
when it comes to constitutional interpretation may have less force in the context of separation
of powers decisions. 
102. These cases remained firmly rooted in private law tradition. In 1893, James B. Thayer
explained that Congress ordinarily had the final word with respect to the constitutionality of
legislation “except as some individual, among the innumerable chances of his private affairs,
found it for his interest to raise a judicial question about it.” James B. Thayer, The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 136 (1893). 
103. See Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 730-31 (1878); Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.)
14, 18 (1800) (Washington, J.); id. at 19 (Paterson, J.); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 395
(1798) (Chase, J.); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796) (Chase, J.); see also
BICKEL, supra note 36, at 35-36; KRAMER, supra note 96, at 103; Thayer, supra note 102, at
144.
104. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 173 (1796) (emphasis omitted); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 55-58
(1985); KRAMER, supra note 96, at 103 & n.71 (noting that the Court ignored procedural issues
in order to rule in favor of the legislature).
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Congress and the President in considering questions about the
Constitution.105 Even during that period, however, the courts had
yet to establish with certainty their paramount role in inter-
preting the Constitution.106 From the nullifiers in the 1830s to the
Republicans in the 1870s to southern segregationists in the 1950s,
the theory that the courts had no more than a coordinate ability to
interpret the Constitution, and could not bind the other branches
of the federal government or the state government, remained vi-
brant.107 
Not until the landmark Cooper v. Aaron decision in 1958 did the
Supreme Court assert that its interpretation of the Constitution
unequivocally bound all others. Referring to Marbury, the Court
asserted that “decision declared the basic principle that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution”
and, as a result, the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretation
has “binding effect on the States.”108 Aaron engaged in historical
revision because the Court had never before declared its interpreta-
tion of the Constitution universally binding.109 Nevertheless, Aaron
cemented the Court’s position as the ultimate constitutional auth-
ority and that role has remained stable ever since.110
Federal courts have also dramatically increased their capacity to
act. In the Founding Era, Supreme Court justices rode circuit, pre-
siding over federal trials throughout the fledgling nation. By 1915,
the federal judiciary had expanded only slightly to include 120
judges scattered about the United States.111 During the remainder
105. Although the federal judiciary held only two federal statutes unconstitutional during
its first century, that number has climbed to over 150 today. See Keith E. Whittington,
Judicial Review and Interpretation: Have the Courts Become Sovereign When Interpreting the
Constitution?, in THE JUDICIAL BRANCH, supra note 34, at 116, 126.
106. See KRAMER, supra note 96, at 213-14.
107. See id. at 179-80. The nullification movement argued that the Constitution was in
essence a treaty between sovereign states and that, as a result, each state had independent
authority to interpret it irrespective of any pronouncement by federal courts. Id.
108. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
109. See KRAMER, supra note 96, at 221.
110. In an era of judicial supremacy, Hamilton’s reassurance that the courts are the least
dangerous branch because they lack power over the sword or purse sounds hollow. The federal
courts must rely on the machinery of the executive branch to carry out judgments, but if the
courts are acknowledged to have the final word on constitutional meaning, then the executive
branch would seem to have little, if any, discretion to disobey. 
111. Resnik, supra note 62, at 662.
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of the twentieth century, however, the number of federal judges
exploded. By the end of the century, there were 2,000 judges,
overseeing over 30,000 staff.112
At that point, the federal courts possessed the authority and
capacity to shape political and social life through binding interpreta-
tions of the Constitution, federal statutes, and the common law. And
the Constitution provided few clear mechanisms by which the
political branches could check the power of the courts. Although
they retained the power to change the law, this has proven to be a
flimsy check on judicial power.
To the extent the courts resolve cases arising from statutes, regu-
lations, or the common law, the other branches retain an important
power: they can always change the law.113 In this way, aspects of the
judicial power are naturally subordinate to the legislative and
executive branches.114 If, for example, a federal court issued an
advisory opinion about the requirements of public nuisance law,
that decision would be subject to Congressional override. Although
Congress and the President may not have constitutional means of
checking such a usurpation of authority by the courts, they may be
able to achieve similar results by changing the law through legis-
lation. 
Judicial decisions interpreting statutes and the common law
prove surprisingly resilient given the authority of the political
branches.115 Congress has difficulty changing the law, particularly
when powerful interest groups take opposing positions, which is
often the case in the wake of a Supreme Court decision.116 Even
112. Id. at 663.
113. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 334 (1991).
114. Judges may make the common law, see Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a
Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution
and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 6 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997), but legislatures can supplant the common law by statute. Canons of
statutory construction limit the legislature’s power to some extent because “[s]tatutes which
invade the common law ... are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-
established and familiar principles.” Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 359 (2005)
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)).
115. See Eskridge, supra note 113, at 377.
116. Id. Eskridge’s model suggests that in many circumstances the Court has the power
to “read its own raw preferences into statutes without congressional override.” Id. at 416.
Moreover, Eskridge overlooks the ability of the judiciary to interpret legislation overriding
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when a statute purports to override a statutory or common law
decision, the courts then have the opportunity to interpret the new
statute and can also invoke constitutional provisions to achieve
their desired result.117 
Although the constitutional pronouncements of the federal courts
theoretically face a similar check through the amendment process,
in reality, Article V imposes such high hurdles to constitutional
amendment that it places this approach beyond practical reality.118
C. Internal Checks on Judicial Authority
Because courts lack meaningful external checks on their author-
ity, jurisdictional procedure has developed to provide a mechanism
by which courts can prevent themselves from overstepping their
constitutional authority. Through jurisdictional procedure, courts
police themselves, serving both theoretical and pragmatic goals. 
From a theoretical perspective, the courts have found themselves
in the position most feared by the Framers: they exercise authority
without obvious constitutional constraint.119 Although the Constitu-
tion does not provide a meaningful external constraint on judicial
power, the courts have internalized the Framers’ concerns and
developed rules to serve as a second-best approximation of checks
and balances.120 These internal checks look quite different from the
prior judicial decisions.
117. The story of congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity in the context of
disability rights provides an example of the Supreme Court repeatedly frustrating the purpose
of legislation, see, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 113, at 409-10, as does the Court’s repeated
narrowing of Title VII despite repeated congressional overrides. See, e.g., Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 618-19 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 228, 241 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1071; Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974), superseded by statute
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978). Moreover,
constitutional principles prevent Congress from overruling the courts with respect to a case
already decided. See Karlan, supra note 89, at 544. 
118. See Whittington, supra note 105, at 132-33. Amendments have reversed constitutional
decisions of the Supreme Court only four times. See Toma, supra note 77, at 131. 
119. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 584 (2009); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742-43
(2008); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison); see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S.
748, 756 (1996); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952).
120. Cf. R.G. Lipsey & R.K. Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON.
STUD. 11, 11 (1956) (discussing the economic theory of the second best). In a similar vein, Neal
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system of interbranch competition that restrains the other
branches.121 Jurisdictional procedure is self-imposed, but nonethe-
less, serves the basic purpose of keeping the judiciary within
constitutional bounds.122
Jurisdictional procedure incorporates robust limitations on judi-
cial authority because courts have recognized the importance of
adhering to separation of powers principles. To protect fundamental
ordering of the federal government, courts correctly do not rely on
the parties to raise jurisdictional issues.123 The stakes are high and
the incentives faced by parties may differ dramatically from the
values reflected in the Constitution. Indeed, one can easily conceive
of litigants that would happily turn to the courts to definitively
resolve questions of public policy rather than relying on the tumult
of the political process. Even when rigid enforcement of separation
of powers would instrumentally facilitate the interests of individual
parties, these issues are simply too important to the legitimacy of
the federal government to trust parties to identify and fully litigate
jurisdictional issues.124 
Policing jurisdiction also fulfills a more pragmatic concern of the
federal courts because it helps maintain legitimacy.125 Courts have
Kumar Katyal has proposed that the executive branch develop internal checks on its
authority. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316-18 (2006). Because Congress no
longer functions as a check against the President, Katyal argues that creating internal checks
serves as a second-best option. Id.
121. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1155-56 (1992).
122. Founding fundamental aspects of government on self-restraint may seem like flimsy
stock from which to build a constitutional order, but there are aspects of the judiciary that
lend themselves to the endeavor. Of all of the branches, judges are the most professionalized,
and the practice of judging incorporates long-lived institutional customs that remind judges
of their role in our separation of powers. See BICKEL, supra note 36, at 25-26. So perhaps the
enterprise is less desperate than it would first appear.
123. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
124. When it comes to separation of powers, those with the most at stake—the President
and Congress—are not necessarily participants in the case and may not even know of its
existence. Numerous legal doctrines—third-party standing, collateral estoppel, and class
certification criteria, for example—recognize the pitfall of adjudicating the rights of those
outside the four corners of a case.
125. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that self-restraint relates to the legitimacy of
the courts. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 103 (1978)
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
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few means of directly enforcing judgments, and so they rely on the
respect of the other branches and the public. The Constitution may
provide no meaningful check against judicial authority, but
Congress and the President could resort to extraconstitutional
mechanisms should they lose faith in courts.126 Indeed, President
Abraham Lincoln engaged in just such a course of conduct when he
issued orders to the military “suspending” the writ of habeas
corpus.127 Based on these orders, the military refused to comply with
judicial orders requiring the production of prisoners.128 Some have
suggested that the decision in Bush v. Gore could have led to similar
extraconstitutional resistance if former Vice President Gore had not
withdrawn gracefully from the field.129 It is a testament to the
effectiveness of jurisdictional procedure that the American public
continues to hold the federal courts in high regard, especially when
compared to the other branches, and that the courts have faced few
other serious challenges to their authority.
Understanding that jurisdictional procedure creates a substitute
for checks and balances theoretically justifies the duty of jurisdic-
tional inquiry’s significant departure from the ordinary rules of our
adversarial system. It also helps explain its history. Jurisdictional
procedure developed in three stages—a common law era, a statutory
era, and a constitutional era—which correspond with the evolving
power of the federal courts in important ways. 
The first period lasted for roughly the first one hundred years of
the federal courts. During this common law era, courts approached
jurisdiction formalistically. The courts recognized an obligation to
126. The writings of James Madison and Alexander Hamilton suggest that they viewed the
judiciary as weak precisely because the other branches could resort to extraconstitutional
means to undermine the judiciary. For example, James Madison wrote that “a State which
would violate the Legislative rights of the Union, would not be very ready to obey a Judicial
decree in support of them,” similarly suggesting nonconstitutional means to undermine
judicial authority. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 205, 211 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977). 
127. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 999 (2008).
128. Id. 
129. ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 30. Cass Sunstein suggests that the “largest lesson of
Bush v. Gore lies in its utter failure to damage the Court as an institution.” Cass R. Sunstein,
Judges and Democracy: The Changing Role of the United States Supreme Court, in THE
JUDICIAL BRANCH, supra note 34, at 32, 55. 
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independently evaluate jurisdiction,130 but this reflected a view
commonly held by state courts and preconstitutional common law
courts that a pleading must properly invoke jurisdiction to empower
a court to decide a case.131 The theory bore no relationship to
separation of powers, federalism, or the Constitution, but rather
reflected prevailing notions about the nature of courts.132 Perhaps
consequently, courts’ approach to jurisdiction was more formal than
effective.
During the common law era, courts considered their jurisdiction
simply by reviewing the complaint. So long as the complaint alleged
adequate facts to trigger federal jurisdiction, the courts viewed
themselves as possessing power to enter judgment, even if it turned
out that the facts in the complaint were false.133 In other words, the
courts did not apply an internal constraint on their authority, but
rather, assured themselves that the parties complied with a
pleading requirement. The factual underpinnings of jurisdiction
only came before the courts if the defendant filed a plea for abate-
ment prior to answering and disputing the allegations in the com-
plaint.134 If the defendant failed to file such a plea, the defendant
was deemed to waive any objection to the jurisdictional facts, even
if they were disproven at trial.135 Indeed, the courts erected sub-
stantial barriers to contesting jurisdictional facts. If defendants
chose to file pleas for abatement, and the courts ruled against them,
then the defendants were deemed to have conceded their liability on
the merits.136 
130. See Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126, 127 (1804); Turner v. Bank of N.
Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11 (1799).
131. See, e.g., Stephens v. Bales of Cotton, 22 F. Cas. 1278, 1279 (D.S.C. 1800) (No. 13366);
Respublica v. Cobbet, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 467, 476 (Pa. 1798); Kirkbride v. Durden, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.)
288, 289-91 (Pa. 1788). See generally Dan B. Dobbs, The Decline of Jurisdiction by Consent,
40 N.C. L. REV. 49, 49 (1961).
132. See Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884); Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868).
133. For a discussion of the early practice of viewing many jurisdictional issues as subject
to waiver, see Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1829, 1838-40
(2007); Dodson, supra note 5, at 1452-53.
134. See Steigleder v. McQuesten, 198 U.S. 141, 142 (1905). 
135. Collins, supra note 133, at 1839-40; see also DeSobry v. Nicholson, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
420, 423 (1865).
136. Collins, supra note 133, at 1841.
2012] JURISDICTIONAL PROCEDURE 33
This was a period dominated by private law. Courts considered
the personal affairs of litigants and only occasionally touched upon
the acts of other branches of the federal government.137 Courts
rarely dealt with litigation in which private parties sought to vindi-
cate the rights of the public against the government or other private
actors. As a result, the day-to-day activities of the federal courts
bore little relationship to separation of powers. Courts largely acted
in the same way as the common law courts of England, with little
opportunity to consider far-reaching questions of public policy.138
They did not need to police jurisdiction with vigor because they were
rarely asked to reach beyond the obvious contours of the federal
judicial power.139 
The statutory era commenced with the passage of the Judiciary
Act of 1875 in the wake of the Civil War. The Act significantly
expanded federal jurisdiction and granted litigants a broad right to
remove cases to a federal forum.140 Predictably, this resulted in a
significant increase in the number of cases heard in federal court.141
In response, Congress expanded the federal court system in 1891,
creating the familiar appellate hierarchy that exists today through
the Circuit Court of Appeals Act.142
The 1875 Judiciary Act not only thrust the federal courts into an
increasing number of controversies, but it also significantly modified
jurisdictional procedure, requiring courts to consider throughout a
proceeding whether a case “really and substantially involve[s] a
dispute or controversy properly within [its] jurisdiction.”143 In 1898,
the Supreme Court interpreted that language to require courts to
assess jurisdiction based on “the facts as they really exist.”144 
137. See Ann Stuart Anderson, A 1787 Perspective on Separation of Powers, in SEPARATION
OF POWERS—DOES IT STILL WORK? 138, 154 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1986).
138. See id.
139. When courts were asked to act outside of their authority, they responded swiftly and
firmly. For example, when President Washington requested an advisory opinion from the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, he refused. See id. at 146. But those few occasions did not
require a systematic doctrine to preserve separation of powers.
140. See Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal Foundation
of Judicial Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1162 (2011).
141. Id. at 1164.
142. Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 826.
143. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472.
144. Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.S. 115, 120 (1898).
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The statutory era was dominated by corporations seeking to pro-
tect their private interests in federal courts.145 Often, they chal-
lenged state and federal statutes on constitutional grounds.146 The
increasing public law docket of the federal courts triggered parallel
transformations in the approach to jurisdiction. Prior to the 1920s,
jurisdictional determinations remained confined to questions about
the amount in controversy, the citizenship of parties, and whether
a case presented a federal question. Each of those questions turn on
statutory criteria provided by Congress to govern federal jurisdic-
tion. 
But then, seismically, jurisdiction took on constitutional dimen-
sions as the Supreme Court developed doctrines like standing, ripe-
ness, and mootness, which impose limitations on federal jurisdiction
under Article III of the Constitution.147 In its 1921 decision in
Fairchild v. Hughes, the Supreme Court dismissed a suit challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the Nineteenth Amendment explaining
that the case “[i]n form ... is a bill in equity; but it is not a case
within the meaning of § 2 of Article 3 of the Constitution.”148 The
following year, the Massachusetts v. Mellon Court explicitly linked
limitations derived from Article III to separation of powers,
explaining: 
We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on
the ground that they are unconstitutional.... To do so would be
not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position of
authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal
department, an authority which plainly we do not possess.149 
Jurisdictional procedure also took on constitutional dimensions.
In the 1934 decision in Mitchell v. Maurer, the Supreme Court
145. See Friedman & Delaney, supra note 140, at 1162-63.
146. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 162 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 49 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 579-80 (1897); see also Friedman &
Delaney, supra note 140, at 1167-68 (discussing liberty of contract jurisprudence).
147. See, e.g., Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing
Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 594-96
(2010); Sunstein, supra note 30, at 165, 168-69; Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the
Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1432-34 (1988). 
148. 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922).
149. 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923). 
2012] JURISDICTIONAL PROCEDURE 35
articulated the procedural rule that remains true today: “Unlike an
objection to venue, lack of federal jurisdiction cannot be waived or
be overcome by an agreement of the parties. An appellate federal
court must satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also of
that of the lower courts in a cause under review.”150 In so stating the
rule, the Court altogether ignored the Judiciary Act of 1875 and the
precedent that interpreted it, relying instead on a case from the
common law era that had required only a formalistic review of the
pleadings.151
So began the constitutional era of jurisdictional procedure.152
During this period, which continues today, litigants often ask fed-
eral courts to consider the constitutionality of statutes and the
legality or wisdom of executive branch activity, and the courts freely
entertain these claims. The Supreme Court struck down only two
statutes between ratification and the civil war. Between 1990 and
2000, however, it struck down thirty federal laws.153 Litigants also
frequently attempt to enforce statutes intended to protect public
rights against alleged violators. The era of public interest law has
required a robust procedural mechanism to keep the courts in their
constitutionally assigned place.154
Gone are the days when a court would merely look at the face of
the complaint and decide that the plaintiff properly invoked juris-
diction.155 Courts and commentators alike assume that Article III
150. 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934).
151. Id. (citing Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382
(1884)). While the Supreme Court decided Mansfield after passage of the 1875 Judiciary Act,
the case was commenced in 1874. See Mansfield, 111 U.S. at 380.
152. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331 (1977); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 245-46
(1971). The constitutionalization of jurisdictional procedure occurred relatively slowly. As late
as 1969, the American Law Institute considered only briefly the constitutional dimensions of
jurisdiction when it proposed new rules that would prevent parties from raising questions of
subject matter jurisdiction on appeal. See THE AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 368-69, 373-74 (1969); see also Dan B.
Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Final
Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491, 520 (1964).
153. See KRAMER, supra note 96, at 213.
154. See id. at 131, 135 (advocating minimal court involvement in federalism). There is no
doubt that the increased role of the courts has led to development and expansion of
substantive jurisdictional doctrine. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1302-04 (1976); Ho & Ross, supra note 147, at 594.
155. During this same period, courts began to view justiciability doctrines as requiring,
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mandates substantive limitations on the jurisdiction of federal
courts, although they frequently disagree about what those limi-
tations should be.156 “Although raised by neither of the parties,”
courts are now “obliged to examine the standing of appellees, as a
matter of the case-or-controversy requirement associated with
Art[icle] III.”157
As we have seen, jurisdictional procedure evolved in lockstep with
the increasing scope of authority of the federal courts. As judicial
supremacy became part of the fabric of our federal government,
placing the courts beyond any meaningful external check—either
explicit or implicit—the courts developed the duty of jurisdictional
inquiry to serve as an internal apparatus preserving separation of
powers and limiting federal court activity to the domain assigned by
the Constitution.158 
    II. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF JURISDICTIONAL  
PROCEDURE
Appreciating the radical nature of jurisdictional procedure
requires an examination of the bedrock adversarial principles that
undergird the United States’ legal system. Jurisdictional procedure
blends two different theories of legal process: adversarial and
inquisitorial theory.159 It is inquisitorial in that the duty of jurisdic-
tional inquiry places courts—rather than parties—in control of
litigation, requiring termination of a case for lack of jurisdiction on
the court’s own motion regardless of whether the parties have ever
raised or even addressed a jurisdictional issue. Yet jurisdictional
procedure often includes significant adversarial features because
rather than authorizing, dismissal. See Matthew I. Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA
L. Rev. 1257, 1269 (2011).
156. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982)).
157. Juidice, 430 U.S. at 331.
158. It is, of course, impossible to demonstrate that courts’ increased power caused shifts
in their approach to jurisdiction. Rather, I claim only that the two should be viewed as aspects
of the same evolution of federal judicial power.
159. Francesco Parisi, Rent-Seeking Through Litigation: Adversarial and Inquisitorial
Systems Compared, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 193, 207 (2002); see also supra notes 16-22 and
accompanying text.
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courts view parties as obliged to present relevant facts, even if no
jurisdictional issue has yet been raised.160
The labels inquisitorial and adversarial evoke a rich history of
legal theory developed in both common law and civil law countries.
Section A provides a sketch of those theories, emphasizing the
aspects of adversarialism and inquisitorialism most relevant to
jurisdictional adjudication.161 Section B explains that despite the
common description of adversarialism and inquisitorialism as
antithetical to one another, no legal system perfectly embodies
either. Instead, all systems borrow rules and principles from both.162
Nonetheless, the inquisitorialism woven throughout the American
legal system remains largely unacknowledged. A collective insis-
tence that our system is adversarial, accompanied by denial of its
inquisitorial features, obscures fruitful avenues for legal reform.
A. Adversarial Theory and Inquisitorial Theory
Two procedural theories form the basis of modern legal sys-
tems.163 Those theories—inquisitorialism and adversarialism—arose
out of the two predominant western legal traditions, civil law and
common law: with civil law jurisdictions that dominate Europe and
South America considered fundamentally inquisitorial, and common
law jurisdictions that dominate England and its former colonies,
including the United States, considered fundamentally adver-
sarial.164
160. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
161. This discussion is couched in terms of theory—rather than discussing the adversarial
and inquisitorial “systems”—to emphasize that these sets of norms are philosophical in nature
and not always, or even ever, applied whole-cloth.
162. See J.A. Jolowicz, Adversarial and Inquisitorial Models of Civil Procedure, 52 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 281, 281 (2003).
163. Each theory arose from the ashes of distinctly religious mechanisms of European
dispute resolution such as trial by combat or ordeal. See STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 8-9 (1984); Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the
Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 320-21 (1989). Those mechanisms
disappeared in 1215, when the Fourth Lateran Council prohibited churches from officiating
over trial by ordeals, sapping them of any legitimacy. LANDSMAN, supra, at 10. Thereafter, the
jury system arose in England, developing into today’s common law tradition, and continental
Europe developed the Roman-canon system that evolved into the civil law tradition.  See id.
at 10-12.
164. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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Broadly stated, both theories share the same goal: to uncover the
truth underlying a dispute and reach a fair and just outcome based
on the law. But the two theories approach that task very differently.
Inquisitorial theory charges judges with uncovering the facts
through impartial investigation and reaching the correct decision
based on those facts. Professional judges are deemed to know best
what information to compile and law to consider and, as a result,
inquisitorialism has been described as embodying a communitarian
or paternalistic view that advantages truth over the autonomy of
the individual.165 Inquisitorialism is also viewed as valuing effi-
ciency over procedure because it does not provide robust procedural
rights that parties can use to obstruct courts’ truth-divining func-
tion.166
Adversarialism also concerns itself with reaching the correct
result, but delegates to opposing parties responsibility for ferreting
out the relevant law and facts, on the presumption that the parties
themselves are best situated to ascertain both. Adversarial theory
also posits that permitting parties to control the contours of their
cases serves a legitimizing function, creating an impression of
fairness that may lead to societal acceptance of court judgments.167
Judges concern themselves with truth only in so far as it arises from
the presentation of opposing viewpoints.168 As a former Chief Judge
of the High Court of Australia put it, “Within the adversarial system
... the function of the courts is not to pursue the truth but to decide
on the cases presented by the parties.”169 
165. See Felicity Nagorcka et al., Stranded Between Partisanship and the Truth? A
Comparative Analysis of Legal Ethics in the Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems of Justice,
29 MELB. U. L. REV. 448, 452 n.14 (2005); Sward, supra note 163, at 315.
166. See Parisi, supra note 159, at 206-07.
167. See STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN
APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 33-34 (1988); George C. Christie, Objectivity in the Law, 78 YALE
L.J. 1311, 1329 (1969).
168. See Nagorcka et al., supra note 165, at 462.
169. The Honorable Sir Anthony Mason, The Future of Adversarial Justice 4 (Aug. 7, 1999)
(transcript available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/2459633/THE-FUTURE-OF); see also
Jolowicz, supra note 162, at 284 (quoting Lord Denning). Some proponents of adversarial
theory contend that contested hearings are the best way of arriving at the truth. See, e.g.,
WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 1395, at 94; Lon Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON
AMERICAN LAW 34, 40 (Harold J. Berman ed., 1971). Others disagree. For example, John
Jolowicz suggests that “cross-examination can discover and reveal untruth ... [but] that it can
actually reveal the hitherto unrevealed truth is much more doubtful.” Jolowicz, supra note
162, at 283; see also John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI.
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These broad differences in philosophy manifest in contrasting
approaches to the relative roles of the judge and parties. Adversarial
theory posits active and engaged parties that present their cases to
a passive judge.170 Adversarial judges do not investigate facts, they
do not consider legal principles apart from those presented by the
parties, and they do not involve themselves in cases until the
moment at which they announce judgment.171 Instead, parties have
exclusive purview to frame their case. And that framing occurs
almost entirely within a hearing in which the parties have the
opportunity to muster the law and facts and to rebut the presenta-
tion of their opponents.172 As the Supreme Court has explained it:
“What makes a system adversarial rather than inquisitorial is ... the
presence of a judge who does not (as an inquisitor does) conduct the
factual and legal investigation himself, but instead decides on the
basis of facts and arguments pro and con adduced by the parties.”173
As a result, adversarial theory posits appellate review limited to the
record and legal issues raised in the lower court. When a lower court
renders a decision based on incomplete facts or in ignorance of
relevant law, the fault is that of the parties, not the court.174 
Inquisitorial theory, in contrast, places the judge, rather than the
parties, in the dominant role.175 The judge is charged with investi-
gating the facts relevant to a dispute and identifying and research-
ing the legal issues.176 This generally does not occur during a single
hearing, but rather over the course of a case the court seeks out
evidence as its relevance becomes apparent.177 When the judge is
satisfied that she has all the evidence she needs and has fully ap-
prised herself of the law, she renders a decision. The parties remain
L. REV. 823, 833 (1985). But see Ronald J. Allen et al., The German Advantage in Civil
Procedure: A Plea for More Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82
NW. U. L. REV. 705, 707 (1988) (arguing that Langbein fails to adequately support alleged
benefits of German civil procedure); see also Ronald J. Allen, Idealization and Caricature in
Comparative Scholarship, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 785 (1988) (same argument).
170. See Jolowicz, supra note 162, at 289.
171. See Parisi, supra note 159, at 195-96.
172. See id. at 194.
173. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991).
174. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991).
175. Parisi, supra note 159, at 193-94.
176. Id.
177. See id.; see also Langbein, supra note 169, at 826-28 (discussing German civil
procedure).
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passive, supplying the court with information on demand, but
otherwise awaiting judgment.178 Because the court has the duty to
gather facts and identify the relevant law, any error in a decision is
attributable to the court.179 As a result, appellate bodies may con-
sider whatever additional facts or law they deem necessary.180
Numerous other institutional differences demark the boundaries
between the two approaches. Adversarial judges rely largely on oral
testimony; inquisitorial judges rely largely on written records.181 In
adversarial theory, complex codes of evidence guide what informa-
tion may be considered; in inquisitorial theory, everything may be
considered and the judges determine for themselves what weight to
place on any particular evidence.182 And, in adversarial theory,
parties are represented by openly partisan counsel versed in the
rules of law and charged with placing their client’s interests in the
best light possible.183 Inquisitorial theory does not require counsel
at all.184
178. See, e.g., Peter J. van Koppen, Miscarriages of Justice in Inquisitorial and Accusatorial
Legal Systems, 7 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 50, 51 (2007); Parisi, supra note 159, at 196;
Sward, supra note 163, at 313; John Thibaut et al., Comment, Adversary Presentation and
Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386, 388 (1972); Jeffrey S. Wolfe & Lisa B.
Proszek, Interaction Dynamics in Federal Administrative Decision Making: The Role of the
Inquisitorial Judge and the Adversarial Lawyer, 33 TULSA L.J. 293, 315 (1997).
179. John Jackson explained the political and historical divergence between adversarial
and inquisitorial theory nicely:
[T]hese approaches were developed in domestic legal systems to correspond with
the social and political climates of their time. Thus, an adversarial procedure
centered around the notion of proceedings as a contest was more suited to a
political climate that saw the need for justice as conflict-resolution within a
reactive state which is “limited to providing a framework within which citizens
can pursue their chosen goals.” In contrast ... inquisitorial procedure ... was
more suited to seeing justice as implementing policy within an active state
dedicated to the “material and moral betterment of its citizens.” 
John Jackson, Finding the Best Epistemic Fit for International Criminal Tribunals: Beyond
the Adversarial-Inquisitorial Dichotomy, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 17, 19-20 (2009) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting MIRJAM DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 73, 80
(1986)).
180. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 356-57 (2006).
181. See van Koppen, supra note 178, at 53.
182. Parisi, supra note 159, at 195-96.
183. Thibaut et al., supra note 178, at 388.
184. Id.
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B. Translating Theory into Practice
Although the adversarial and inquisitorial approaches are anti-
thetical in theory, in practice, legal systems draw something from
each, even if such hybridization goes largely unnoticed.185 Just as
legal systems traditionally associated with inquisitorialism have
borrowed from adversarial theory, so too has the American legal
system borrowed from inquisitorial theory. Nonetheless, our legal
culture often frames itself in opposition to inquisitorialism. That
mindset conceals the inquisitorial nature of certain legal practices
like jurisdictional procedure and blinkers identification of fruitful
avenues for reform.
At a general level, the American legal system is clearly an adver-
sarial one. The parties to a lawsuit frame its factual and legal terms
in the complaint and answer. Plaintiffs must substantiate their
claims with admissible evidence, and defendants similarly must
prove any affirmative defenses they wish to raise. In general, the
court does not reach beyond the contours of the case presented by
the parties.
But that appearance masks numerous inquisitorial features that
operate in the shadows of our legal system’s overarching adversarial
architecture. The mandatory disclosure provisions of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(a) and the case management responsibilities
assigned to district courts under Rule 26(f) are inquisitorial pro-
cesses that give courts an active hand in shaping cases even before
trial.186 In the criminal context, grand juries have always assumed
investigative duties that can only be described as inquisitorial.187
Certain federal administrative proceedings also draw from the
inquisitorial tradition, particularly in the context of federal benefits
185. As John Jolowicz has put it: “[T]he most that can be said is that some systems are
more adversarial—or more inquisitorial—than others.” Jolowicz, supra note 162, at 281; see
also Mason, supra note 169, at 1; Thibaut et al., supra note 178, at 388.
186. See, e.g., Jolowicz, supra note 162, at 286; Rogelio A. Lasso, Gladiators Be Gone: The
New Disclosure Rules Compel a Reexamination of the Adversary Process, 36 B.C. L. REV. 479,
481 (1995); Wolfe & Proszek, supra note 178, at 308; Mason, supra note 169, at 1.
187. See, e.g., George H. Dession & Isadore H. Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand
Juries, 41 YALE L.J. 687, 691 (1932). The Supreme Court has long recognized the inquisitorial
dimensions of grand juries. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991);
United States v. John Doe, Inc., 481 U.S. 102, 118-19, 123 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 262, 264 (1948).
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determinations.188 For example, the Social Security Administration
self-consciously charges the hearings officer that presides over a
benefits contest with the duty of identifying legal questions,
discovering facts, and rendering a determination.189 
Courts that raise issues sua sponte do not act within the confines
of adversarial theory, either.190 Indeed, Thomas Marvall suggests
that “[t]he adversary process is no more starkly challenged than
when a court decides an issue not raised, for it actually decides
something other than what the parties asked it to decide.”191 Yet
courts, on occasion, raise a host of issues on their own initiative,
including issues of federalism and comity.192 Based on principles of
avoidance, courts sometimes consider questions of statutory inter-
pretation, even when the parties have brought and briefed only
constitutional claims.193 Courts also sometimes raise plain errors
committed in criminal trials.194 Courts broadly retain the discretion
to apply the correct law, even if the parties have not argued it.195
188. See Jon C. Dubin, Torquemada Meets Kafka: The Misapplication of the Issue
Exhaustion Doctrine to Inquisitorial Administrative Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1289,
1301 (1997); William W. Milligan, Essay, Torquemada and Unemployment Compensation
Appeals, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 389, 393 (1996) (identifying certain unemployment
compensation hearings as inquisitorial).
189. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1400(b) (1987); Dubin, supra note 188, at 1291; see also Heckler
v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 471 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring). The inquisitorial nature of
proceedings before the Social Security Administration demonstrates that adversarial norms
are less dominant in the United States than many might think: approximately 80 percent of
the administrative law judges employed by the federal government work for the Social
Security Administration. See Wolfe & Proszek, supra note 178, at 294. But see Dubin, supra
note 188, at 1293-94 (noting that the procedural rigidity of SSA proceedings harms social
security claimants). 
190. See Jeffrey C. Metzcar, Note, Raising the Defense of Procedural Default Sua Sponte:
Who Will Enforce the Great Writ of Liberty?, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 869, 907-08 (2000).
191. THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION GATHERING IN
THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 121 (1978).
192. See Metzcar, supra note 190, at 870. In Turner v. Rogers, the Supreme Court required
procedural safeguards to further the due process rights of indigent parents threatened with
civil contempt for non-payment of child support. 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2517-18 (2011). The
procedural safeguards considered by the Court included procedures by which state courts
would inquire into the ability to pay of the non-custodial parent, implicitly acknowledging
that inquisitorial procedures can further due process in some circumstances. See id. at 2518.
193. See, e.g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 457 (1960).
194. See, e.g., Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717, 718 (1962); United States v. Gonzalez,
259 F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2001).
195. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991); Smith v. Mallick, 514 F.3d
48, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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And, of course, courts must raise issues of jurisdiction regardless of
whether the parties prompt them to do so.196
Despite the widespread hybridization of adversarial and inquisi-
torial theory, both within the United States and abroad,197 the
American legal system perpetuates an “adversarial myth,”198
proudly proclaiming adherence to adversarialism and disdain for
procedures labeled as inquisitorial.199 American legal commentators
have described the American system of procedure as “avowedly
adversary,”200 and exhibiting “anti-inquisitorialism.”201 Others have
noted that “[t]he hallmark of American adjudication is the adver-
sary system,”202 and called adversary process “[t]he heart of the
American legal system.”203 Some of the greatest American legal
thinkers have propounded the virtues of adversarialism at the
expense of inquisitorialism. Henry Wigmore described adversarial
cross-examination as “beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine
196. Some have simply ignored the inquisitorial dimensions of jurisdictional procedure. For
example, Neal Devins has explained that “[a] central tenet of our adversarial system is that
(save for jurisdictional issues) the parties to a case—not the judges deciding the case—raise
the legal arguments.” Neal Devins, Asking the Right Questions: How Courts Honored the
Separation of Powers by Reconsidering Miranda, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 252 (2000). Simply
accepting that the procedure for resolving jurisdiction deviates from a “central tenet” of our
legal system minimizes the deeply inquisitorial nature of jurisdictional procedure. See Miller,
supra note 19, at 1307-08 (“[I]f one accepts the premise that writ of error review remains the
best model, appellate courts should be permitted to raise nonjurisdictional matters sua sponte
only in the most exceptional cases, to remedy the gravest injustices.” (emphasis added)). 
197. Traditionally inquisitorial legal systems also exhibit adversarial features. See
Jolowicz, supra note 162, at 281; Kessler, supra note 17, at 1261-62; see also JOHN HARRY
MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 4-5 (3d ed. 2007); Leonard L. Cavise, Essay,
The Transition from the Inquisitorial to the Accusatorial System of Trial Procedure: Why Some
Latin American Lawyers Hesitate, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 785, 785-86 (2007) (discussing the
transition in Latin American countries). International tribunals have also developed
procedures that draw on both the inquisitorial and adversarial tradition. See Michael Asimow
& Lisl Dunlop, The Many Faces of Administrative Adjudication in the European Union, 61
ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 141-44 (2009). 
198. Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding,
61 DUKE L.J. 1, 68 (2011).
199. See William T. Pizzi, Sentencing in the US: An Inquisitorial Soul in an Adversarial
Body?, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
65, 66 (John Jackson et al. eds., 2008); see also Gorod, supra note 198, at 2-5.
200. Thibaut et al., supra note 178, at 388.
201. Sklansky, supra note 22, at 1635.
202. Sward, supra note 163, at 301. 
203. Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte
Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 247 (2002).
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ever invented for the discovery of truth;”204 Lon Fuller lauded
“adversary presentation [as] the only effective means for combating
[the] natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the
familiar that which is not yet fully known;”205 and Karl Llewellyn
expressed deep skepticism “for any decision which is placed in part
on any basis dug up by the court itself, but which is theretofore new
to the [parties to the] case.”206 Supreme Court opinions also reflect
these beliefs. Justice Souter has opined that “[s]ound judicial
decisionmaking requires ‘both a vigorous prosecution and a vigorous
defense’ of the issues in dispute,”207 and Justice Scalia explained
that the rule that issues may not be raised for the first time on
appeal “distinguishes our adversary system of justice from the
inquisitorial one.”208 A quip offered by D.C. Circuit Judge Ginsburg
at an oral argument exemplifies this anti-inquisitorial sentiment.
In Cobell v. Norton he scoffed, “[A] judicial officer with investigative
responsibilities ... [is,] dare we say, [a] French approach.”209 
In light of the exalted status of adversarialism in American legal
culture, it comes as little surprise that the label inquisitorial is
something of a taboo.210 Considering the criminal law context, David
Sklansky recently explained, “A lengthy tradition in American law
looks to the Continental, inquisitorial system of criminal adjudica-
tion for negative guidance about our own ideals. Avoiding inquis-
itorialism is taken to be a core commitment of our legal heritage.”211
Amalia Kessler has noted a similar phenomenon in American civil
law. She writes that “we have mistakenly come to view our legal
204. WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 1367, at 27.
205. Fuller, supra note 169, at 44.
206. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 325 (1960).
207. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 572-73 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419 (1978)).
208. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment);
see also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (emphasizing the importance of vigorous
representation); Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (noting that an adversarial
system advances the public interest); Mackey v. Montrym, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (“[O]ur legal
tradition regards the adversary process as the best means of ascertaining truth.”).
209. Kessler, supra note 17, at 1182 (alteration in original) (quoting Transcript of
Proceedings at 25-26, Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (No. 02-5374)).
210. See, e.g., Kent Roach, Wrongful Convictions: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Themes, 35
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 387, 425 (2010).
211. Sklansky, supra note 22, at 1636.
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tradition as exclusively adversarial and tend to regard all inquisito-
rial modes of procedure as alien.” Kessler concludes, therefore, that
legal reform drawn from inquisitorial theory “has been hindered by
our adversarial self-conception.”212 
Despite our cultural hostility, our legal system can learn from the
inquisitorial tradition.213 This is particularly true for jurisdictional
procedure. I turn now to that issue. 
III. THE FACTUAL DIMENSION OF JURISDICTIONAL PROCEDURE 
The reliance of many courts on an adversarial process to surface
the facts necessary to resolve an inquisitorial obligation poses
particular problems of fairness, accuracy, and efficiency. This Part
begins by outlining the important role of jurisdictional facts and
then discusses each problem in turn. 
A. Facts and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Many questions of jurisdiction involve little or no factual compo-
nent. For example, in Florida v. Thomas, the Supreme Court held
that a decision of the Florida Supreme Court did not constitute a
final judgment and, as a result, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdic-
tion.214 The jurisdictional question turned entirely on the nature of
the decision below and the proper interpretation of the statute
212. Kessler, supra note 17, at 1184-85; see also Parisi, supra note 159, at 207.
213. Commentators increasingly invoke aspects of inquisitorial theory as fertile ground
from which to draw reforms for the American legal system. For example, Amalia Kessler
suggests that applying inquisitorial practices to civil discovery could improve the fairness and
efficiency of complex litigation. Kessler, supra note 17, at 1192. George Marlow has argued
that judges should independently seek out scientific information relevant to the resolution of
cases. George D. Marlow, From Black Robes to White Lab Coats: The Ethical Implications of
a Judge’s Sua Sponte, Ex Parte Acquisition of Social and Other Scientific Evidence During the
Decision-Making Process, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 291, 292-93 (1998). Kent Roach has suggested
that adversarial criminal proceedings could benefit from the incorporation of “[i]nquisitorial
features [that] generally place less reliance on party presentation of the evidence and the
strategic decision-making of the parties.” Roach, supra note 210, at 424; see also Sharon
Finegan, Pro Se Criminal Trials and the Merging of Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems of
Justice, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 447-48 (2009); Raneta Lawson Mack, It’s Broke So Let’s Fix
It: Using a Quasi-Inquisitorial Approach to Limit the Impact of Bias in the American Criminal
Justice System, 7 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 63, 67 (1996).
214. 532 U.S. 774, 777 (2001).
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granting the Supreme Court jurisdiction.215 Similarly, in Louisville
& Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, the Supreme Court held that
the possibility that a defendant would raise a federal law defense in
a breach of contract suit did not trigger federal question juris-
diction.216 In neither case did the Court need to consider jurisdic-
tional facts.
In other circumstances, the factual bases of jurisdiction are
uncomplicated and often beyond dispute. Cases involving diversity
jurisdiction, for example, may require courts to consider the citi-
zenship of the parties,217 and admiralty jurisdiction often turns on
whether the activity that gave rise to the suit predominantly occur-
red at sea.218 Although courts need some information to correctly
determine if they can assert diversity or admiralty jurisdiction, the
necessary jurisdictional facts will often, but not always, be limited
in nature and easily obtained.219
Questions of standing, ripeness, and mootness, on the other hand,
often require consideration of substantially more complex and
disputable facts. To assess standing, courts must undertake a tri-
partite inquiry into injury in fact, causation, and redressability.220
Each of these issues involves facts, and these facts are often bitterly
contested. Similarly, to assess ripeness, courts must consider the
“fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the
parties of withholding court consideration.”221 Assessing hardship,
215. Id. at 777; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006).
216. 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
217. See, e.g., Am.’s Best Inns, Inc. v. Best Inns of Abilene, L.P., 980 F.2d 1072, 1073 (7th
Cir. 1992).
218. See, e.g., Archawski v. Hanioti, 350 U.S. 532, 533 n.2 (1956) (quoting N.J. Steam
Navigation Co. v. Merchs.’ Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 392 (1848)).
219. There remain circumstances in which determining the existence of admiralty
jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction is fact-intensive and complex. For example, federal courts
use competing techniques to value injunctive relief as part of satisfying the amount in
controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1. See Christopher A. Pinahs, Note, Diversity
Jurisdiction and Injunctive Relief: Using a “Moving-Party Approach” To Value the Amount in
Controversy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1930, 1931-32 (2011). Similarly, courts may face complexity and
difficulty in determining whether a “wrong bear[s] a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity” as required for admiralty jurisdiction. Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972). Even determining the citizenship of all of the parties
relevant to complicated lawsuits can prove challenging. See Am.’s Best Inns, 980 F.2d at 1073-
74.
220. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
221. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967); see also Ohio Forestry Ass’n v.
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in particular, requires examination of the factual record in order to
assess the circumstances of the plaintiff. Mootness also often
implicates complex factual issues. As a general rule, a case becomes
moot when events have transpired such that the court can no longer
provide meaningful relief.222 That itself raises factual issues. But the
general rule of mootness also has two exceptions: Cases do not
become moot when a defendant voluntarily ceases allegedly illegal
conduct, unless “subsequent events ma[ke] it absolutely clear that
the allegedly wrongful behavior [can]not reasonably be expected to
recur.”223 And, courts retain jurisdiction over otherwise moot cases
when alleged legal violations are capable of repetition but evading
review.224 Untangling those issues requires substantial factual
information about the current and future state of affairs.
Courts typically glean this information through affidavits or
declarations proffered by the parties. When parties fail to provide
sufficient information on their own, district courts retain broad
authority to order parties to supplement the record with information
relevant to a potential jurisdictional problem.225 
Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732-33 (1998); Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57
(1993). Ripeness “draw[s] both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from
prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t
of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (quoting Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. at 57 n.18).
Whether constitutional or prudential, ripeness defines the contours of subject matter
jurisdiction and “serves as a bar to judicial review whenever a court determines a claim is
filed prematurely.” Dealer Computer Servs., Inc. v. Dub Herring Ford, 547 F.3d 558, 560-61
(6th Cir. 2008); see also BICKEL, supra note 36, at 124.
222. See, e.g., United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203
(1968).
223.  Id.; see also L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 669 F.3d 956, 958 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012)
(raising mootness sua sponte and ruling that the school district’s treatment of an individual
incarcerated in county jail was capable of repetition but evading review).
224. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189-93
(2000). Some question the status of mootness as a jurisdictional doctrine because of these
exceptions that appear prudential in nature. See, e.g., Matthew I. Hall, The Partially
Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562, 576-77 (2009). But see Dodson,
supra note 5, at 1474-77. That mootness has prudential dimensions does not alter the fact
that courts address the issue using jurisdictional procedure. 
225. Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.S. 115, 120 (1898). Of course, district courts do not always
exercise that discretion. For example, in Bingham v. Massachusetts, defendants challenged
plaintiffs’ standing in their reply brief before the district court, arguing that plaintiffs could
not bring claims on behalf of a Native American tribe because they had not provided evidence
of their ancestry. No. 08-11770-GAO, 2009 WL 1259963, at *1 (D. Mass. May 6, 2009), denying
reconsideration, No. 08-11770-GAO, 2009 WL 1886128 (D. Mass. July 2, 2009), aff ’d, 616 F.3d
1 (1st Cir. 2010). The district court agreed and dismissed the suit. Id. The plaintiffs then
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When, however, a jurisdictional problem is not identified until the
case is on appeal and the factual record established in district court
proceedings is insufficient to resolve it, the situation is more
complicated and courts have utilized starkly different procedures.
Sometimes courts permit or require an expansion of the factual
record on appeal (“expansion”),226 although this approach may be
invalid after the Supreme Court’s decision in Summers v. Earth
Island Institute;227 sometimes courts remand for further fact-finding
by the district court (“remand”);228 and sometimes courts dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction without considering new information or even
asking the parties to address the issue at all (“dismissal”).229 
Two examples illustrate the expansion approach. In Ouachita
Watch League v. Jacobs, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a standing
issue raised for the first time on appeal and relied on a declaration
submitted on appeal to find that standing existed.230 The court
explained that “it is in the interests of justice and efficiency to
consider the supplemental declarations.”231 The Seventh Circuit took
a more aggressive approach in America’s Best Inns, Inc. v. Best Inns
of Abilene, L.P.232 In considering a contract dispute, the court
recognized that the district court record did not disclose the
citizenship of every member of a limited partnership and, therefore,
the court could not determine if it possessed diversity jurisdiction.233
proffered genealogical records and asked the district court to reconsider its ruling. The district
court refused, ruling that the evidence came too late. Bingham, 2009 WL 1886128, at *2. In
affirming, the First Circuit relied on an analysis for which proffered genealogical records were
irrelevant. Bingham, 616 F.3d at 7 (“Plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider and to amend their
complaint ... [would] not have changed the outcome.”). As a result, the decision does not
address the propriety of the district court’s refusal to consider those documents. 
226. See, e.g., Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 681 F.3d 1208, 1212-13 (10th Cir.
2012) (taking judicial notice of facts that demonstrated that case was moot); Catholic League
for Religious & Civil Rights v. City of S.F., 624 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(“After raising the question of standing sua sponte, we asked the parties for letter briefs
addressing it.”); Piedmont Envtl. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., No. 01-2286, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2176, at *10 (4th Cir. Feb. 7, 2003) (“We grant the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to submit
those declarations and accept them as part of the record, but we find that they are
nonetheless insufficient to establish standing on all counts of the plaintiffs’ complaint.”).
227. 555 U.S. 488, 495 n.* (2009).
228. See, e.g., Pa. Prison Soc’y v. Cortés, 508 F.3d 156, 169 (3d Cir. 2007).
229. See, e.g., McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 253 (3d Cir. 2010).
230. 463 F.3d 1163, 1170 (11th Cir. 2006).
231. Id. at 1171.
232. 980 F.2d 1072, 1074 (7th Cir. 1992).
233. Id. at 1073-74.
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“At oral argument ... the court stated that it would be necessary to
enlarge the record to show the citizenship of every partner as of the
date the complaint was filed.”234 The court then considered post-
argument affidavits before resolving its jurisdiction.235 
In other cases, courts apply the remand approach. The Third
Circuit adopted that approach in Pennsylvania Prison Society v.
Cortés, explaining that “[b]ecause the issue of standing was raised
for the first time on appeal, none of the plaintiffs have had the
opportunity to present evidence or to litigate this issue.”236 As a
result, the court “dismiss[ed] this appeal without prejudice for lack
of jurisdiction and remand[ed] to the District Court.”237 The Fourth
Circuit similarly remanded for further proceedings in Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.,238 explaining “the
record is not sufficiently clear for us to decide” whether the plain-
tiffs’ members “are among the injured.”239
Lastly, and most commonly, courts implement the dismissal
approach, deciding jurisdiction on the record assembled in the
district court. The Sixth Circuit took this approach in Heartwood,
Inc. v. Agpaoa,240 as did the Tenth Circuit in Dias v. City & County
234. Id. at 1073.
235. The court found that even the post-argument affidavits were incomplete and dismissed
the case explaining that “[t]hese litigants have had chance after chance to establish diversity
of citizenship—the complaint, the answer, the jurisdictional statements in their appellate
briefs, and finally the memoranda and filings ... called for at oral argument.... At some point
the train of opportunities ends.” Id. at 1073-74; see also Guar. Nat’l Title Co. v. J.E.G. Assocs.,
101 F.3d 57, 59 (7th Cir. 1996) (reprimanding litigants for failure to file necessary
documentation). America’s Best Inns and Guaranty National Title Co. evidence an approach
that the Seventh Circuit uses. Where the court assures itself of its jurisdiction based on
information it obtains through such means, it seems unlikely that the jurisdictional issue
would even be mentioned in the opinion.
236. 508 F.3d 156, 169 (3d Cir. 2007).
237. Id. (emphasis omitted).
238. No. 06-1714, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 2854, at *22-23 (4th Cir. Feb. 7, 2008). On
remand, the district court ruled that plaintiffs had standing, and the Fourth Circuit then
affirmed this finding. Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 629 F.3d 387,
394-97 (4th Cir. 2011).
239. 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 2854, at *16; see also Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers Ass’n v. Pena,
78 F.3d 585, at *6 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision). Courts of appeals have also
remanded for further factual development where jurisdictional issues other than standing
were involved. For example, in Lucero v. Trosch, 121 F.3d 591, 595 (11th Cir. 1997), the court
recognized a possible issue of mootness and remanded for further proceedings in the district
court.
240. 628 F.3d 261, 268-69 (6th Cir. 2010).
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of Denver, in which the court held that plaintiffs could not seek
prospective relief against the City of Denver because “none had
alleged an intent to return” to the city, even though that issue had
never arisen before the district court.241 This appears to be the
dominant approach of the Supreme Court.242 In a footnote to the
decision in Summers, the Court explained that it would not consider
standing declarations submitted to the court of appeals because “[i]f
[the plaintiffs] had not met the challenge to their standing at the
time of judgment, they could not remedy the defect retroactively.”243 
These multifarious approaches to jurisdictional procedure are
fundamentally inconsistent. If jurisdiction exists only if supported
by facts in the district court record, then a court of appeals exceeds
its jurisdiction when it considers supplemental information or
remands for further factual investigation. If, on the other hand,
jurisdiction turns on facts as they actually exist, courts incorrectly
dismiss cases when they decline to consider information proffered
on appeal. That inconsistency would be resolved if courts of appeals
read the Summers footnote to foreclose in all circumstances the
augmentation of the factual record when a jurisdictional issue arises
for the first time on appeal. But that would improperly exclude from
judicial review cases that the courts ought to hear, and the alterna-
tive approach of remanding for further development is not inconsis-
tent with Summers. 
B. Problems with Dismissing Based on the District Court Record
Resolving jurisdictional questions on appeal based on the record
assembled in the district court leads to an array of problems. These
problems highlight the need for reform.
241. 567 F.3d 1169, 1176, 1184 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Gaslin v. Fassler, No. 09-3833,
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 10819, at *1-2 (8th Cir. May 27, 2010) (dismissing without prejudice);
United States v. Diekemper, 604 F.3d 345, 350-51 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding a lack of standing
and dismissing).
242. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 495 n.* (2009); Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (implementing the dismissal approach).
243. 555 U.S. at 495 n.*; see also FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 234-35
(1990); W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 620 F.3d 1187, 1197 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010)
(accepting supplemental declarations because parties were interveners not original plaintiffs).
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1. Unfairness
Current jurisdictional procedure requires plaintiffs to foresee
possible jurisdictional issues and construct a record related to those
issues, even when the opposing party and district court remain
silent.244 Attorneys are ordinarily not expected to exercise such
foresight. American lawyers are steeped in the adversarial tradition;
lawyers are trained to refute the claims of adversaries, not to
anticipate them. Indeed, the American legal system embraces the
notion that due process requires a meaningful opportunity to be
heard,245 and lawyers without robust federal practices would likely
be surprised to learn that they may lose a case without ever
receiving the opportunity to proffer evidence related to an issue first
raised on appeal.246 
It is unfair to penalize parties when the record before the district
court contains insufficient facts to establish jurisdiction because the
fault lies, in part, with the district court itself. That is because the
district court failed to fulfill its duty to determine jurisdiction so
that “the failure to raise a legal error can in part be attributed to
the magistrate.”247 If the district court had acted properly, then
potential jurisdictional problems would have been raised at a time
when the parties could respond and provide additional facts,
avoiding the dismissal.248 
Freezing the factual record at the time the district court renders
judgment also has the potential to skew litigation incentives.
Defendants could strategically decline to raise jurisdictional issues
244. See Pidot, supra note 16, at 1407-11 (discussing the unfairness of sandbagging
plaintiffs with standing problems on appeal).
245. See, e.g., Milani & Smith, supra note 203, at 262-65; Miller, supra note 19, at 1289.
246. Milani & Smith, supra note 203, at 248 (“[M]ost lawyers probably never think about
the possibility that a court will decide a case on an issue that the court itself raises and which
was neither briefed nor argued by the parties.”).
247. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 357 (2006). In Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme
Court stated that this facet of inquisitorial courts explained why procedural default rules do
not apply to their proceedings. But the Court’s explanation applies with equal force when
American courts overlook jurisdictional issues. See, e.g., Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 126, 126-27 (1804) (“A party may take advantage of an error [on jurisdiction] in his
favor ... [because] it was the duty of the Court to see that [it] had jurisdiction.”).
248. See, e.g., Adventus Ams., Inc. v. Calgon Carbon Corp., No. 3:08-CV-497-RJC-DCK,
2009 WL 2998094, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 15, 2009); Milligan v. United States, Nos. 3:07-1053,
3:08-0380, 2009 WL 2905782, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 4, 2009).
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before the district court.249 Then, they could ask the court of appeals
to dismiss the case because the record is incomplete. In so doing,
defendants not only win—at least in the short term—but also have
the ability of securing binding precedent from the court of appeals
on an issue that could have been corrected below. 
Of course, plaintiffs’ lawyers bear some responsibility for the
factual records in the district court, and the American legal sys-
tem generally charges parties with the failures of their counsel.
That principle normally makes sense because the system vests
parties, and by proxy their lawyers, with control over their cases.250
Protecting the autonomy of parties requires, as a necessary
corollary, that we hold parties accountable for mistakes.251 Control
over jurisdictional issues, however, already resides with the judge,
undercutting the rationale for holding parties accountable for
oversights committed by their lawyers. 
Heartwood, Inc. v. Agpaoa aptly highlights the unfairness of
current practice.252 In that case, the federal government raised no
objection to plaintiffs’ standing and the district court did not
consider the issue. Nor did the government raise a question about
standing in its appellate brief. At oral argument, the Court raised
the issue itself, and then dismissed the case.253 
249. See THE AM. LAW INST., supra note 152, at 366-68; Dobbs, supra note 152, at 492. This
problem may be more hypothetical than real. During my time as a lawyer at the Department
of Justice, I never knew of a case in which the United States declined to raise a jurisdictional
issue for strategic reasons. The temptation exists, however, and not all attorneys are as
scrupulous as my former colleagues.
250. See, e.g., Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); Milani & Smith, supra note 203, at 282-86.
251. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944).
252. 628 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2010). I do not believe that the government intentionally
ignored the jurisdictional issue identified by the court, particularly because the government
never challenged the plaintiffs’ standing. Rather, the court raised the issue on its own. See
Citation of Supplemental Authority: “Standing” Raised by Judge Clay at Oral Argument at
1, Heartwood, 628 F.3d 261 (No. 09-5761).
253. Heartwood, 628 F.3d at 266, 269. Similar unfairness can occur at the district court
stage. For example, in Scanlan v. Eisenberg, the district court ruled that the beneficiary of a
discretionary trust lacked standing to bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the
trustee because she had failed to allege facts showing a likelihood that the trusts’ corpus
would be insufficient. No. 09 C 5026, 2010 WL 4065628, at *2, *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 2010),
rev’d, 669 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing on legal standard). The district court raised this
issue during an oral hearing and the defendant conceded that the plaintiff had standing at
that time. Without asking for further briefing or inviting additional factual submissions, the
district court dismissed the case. Id. 
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The unfairness of penalizing parties for records lacking jurisdic-
tional facts is particularly acute because the requirements for
subject matter jurisdiction change, making it impossible for parties
to anticipate all of the jurisdictional problems that might lie in wait.
Ordinarily, when a trial court applies the wrong standard to evi-
dence in the record, appellate courts will correct the standard and
remand for further proceedings, during which new evidence may be
provided.254 This often does not occur when it comes to jurisdictional
issues. For example, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme
Court held that the members of Defenders of Wildlife needed to
allege a “date certain” on which they planned to visit threatened
natural areas far from their homes in order to allege a sufficiently
imminent injury.255 As the Eighth Circuit had decided below, how-
ever, the law existing when Defenders of Wildlife filed its complaint
imposed a more lenient imminence requirement for standing.256
Thus, Defenders of Wildlife did not know and could not know what
facts it needed to allege to prove standing until the Supreme Court
decided the case. At that point it was too late. The Supreme Court
ordered the case dismissed, even though one or more of Defenders
of Wildlife’s members may have had sufficiently concrete plans to
satisfy the new rule.257
Supreme Court decisions can similarly affect other cases in the
judicial pipeline. A good example is Wilderness Society, Inc. v. Rey,
in which an environmental group challenged a timber sale in the
Umpqua National Forest.258 At the time the suit was filed, Ninth
Circuit law provided that environmental groups could prove
standing based on purely procedural injuries.259 The Wilderness
254. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Humphrey, 434 F.3d 243, 245 (4th Cir. 2006); Roberts v. Royal
Atl. Corp., No. CV 03-2494, 2010 WL 749944, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2010). 
255. 504 U.S. 555, 579 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
256. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 120-21 (8th Cir. 1990), rev’d, 504 U.S.
555 (1992). In reversing, the Supreme Court relied on cases that had involved injuries
speculative in nature because they would not manifest until numerous intervening
circumstances had come to pass. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 & n.2 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas,
495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). But those cases are
not fairly read to require a plaintiff to allege a date certain upon which it will be injured.
257. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578.
258. 622 F.3d 1251, 1256 (9th Cir. 2010).
259. See Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 693 (9th Cir. 2007), aff ’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
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Society proceeded on that basis and the district court entered
judgment in its favor. During the appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the
Supreme Court handed down Summers, holding that procedural
injuries could not themselves sustain standing.260 Recognizing the
change in law, the Ninth Circuit held that the Wilderness Society
had not proven standing and dismissed the case, without offering
the Wilderness Society an opportunity to provide additional evi-
dence.261
Even when the law itself remains constant, jurisdictional pro-
cedure can lead to arbitrary results. Courts dismiss without pre-
judice when they lack jurisdiction, and as a result, some courts view
their jurisdictional decisions as having no preclusive effect on future
litigation.262 In other words, after dismissal, a plaintiff can file
anew, alleging additional facts.263 There are some limitations. A
dismissal without prejudice generally bars future litigation of the
precise issue decided.264 In other words, if a plaintiff alleges stan-
ding based on her desire to visit the Nile River someday in the
future, and the case is dismissed, future courts will refuse to recon-
sider whether these allegations are sufficient under the doctrine of
direct estoppel.265 In some jurisdictions, this principle applies to
prevent relitigation of the same legal issue, even if a plaintiff alleges
260. Summers, 555 U.S. at 496.
261. Wilderness Soc’y, Inc., 622 F.3d at 1260.
262. See, e.g., Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006);
Hernandez v. Conriv Realty Assocs., 182 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 1999); Mann v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 488 F.2d 75, 76 (5th Cir. 1973).
263. See Robinson v. Sherrod, 631 F.3d 839, 843 (7th Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Boyd-
Richardson Co., 650 F.2d 147, 149 (8th Cir. 1981); Mann, 488 F.2d at 76; see also Semtek Int’l
Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001) (“The primary meaning of ‘dismissal
without prejudice,’ we think, is dismissal without barring the plaintiff from returning later,
to the same court, with the same underlying claim.”).
264. See 18 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 132.02(2)(e), at 132-27 (3d
ed. 2012).
265. See, e.g., Steele v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003),
abrogated by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007); MOORE, supra note 264, § 131.30(1)(d)(iv),
at 131-89. Direct estoppel will not apply “where a jurisdictional defect has been cured or loses
its controlling force.” Eaton v. Weaver Mfg. Co., 582 F.2d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 1978); see also
Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1192 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1983); CHARLES A. WRIGHT,
ARTHUR B. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4437 (2d ed.
2002) (“In ordinary circumstances a second action on the same claim is not precluded by
dismissal of a first action for prematurity or failure to satisfy a precondition to suit. No more
need be done than await maturity, satisfy the precondition, or switch to a different
substantive theory that does not depend on the same precondition.”).
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new facts. That rule would seem to prevent parties from bringing
new suits once courts have dismissed their claims for lack of
jurisdiction. Even the more restrictive courts permit relitigation of
jurisdictional issues based on facts that arise after dismissal of the
original suit.266
When it comes to questions of standing, the exception will almost
usually swallow the rule. That is because plaintiffs typically can
engage in activities after dismissal that will satisfy standing.
Consider Heartwood v. Agpaoa. To satisfy the Sixth Circuit, one of
Heartwood’s members need only head out for a hike in the area
subject to the Forest Service’s timber sale. That hike can easily
occur the day after the court dismissed the first suit, and, as a
result, that dismissal will not bar a second suit. 
Dismissal without prejudice will typically impose no direct
obstacle to a plaintiff refiling suit. While the court adjudicates a
suit, however, time is ticking. If the court does not dismiss until
after the statute of limitations has run, then the plaintiffs will have
no further opportunity to litigate their claim. In other words, the
real effect of a jurisdictional dismissal largely depends on the length
of time it took for the court to recognize a jurisdictional defect, a
matter over which the parties have little control. If too much time
passes before a case is dismissed, a plaintiff will be unable to renew
suit because the statute of limitations will have run. Thus, similarly
situated plaintiffs may end up with very different legal results for
reasons that have nothing to do with the worthiness of their cause
or the legal viability of their claim, a state of affairs that runs
counter to our general notions of due process and equal protection.267 
Contrasting the Supreme Court decisions in Sierra Club v.
Morton and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife illustrates the arbitrary
effect of jurisdictional rulings. The decision in Sierra Club v. Morton
came only three years after the Forest Service authorized develop-
ment, permitting the Sierra Club to continue its fight and eventu-
ally obtain an injunction against the project.268 On the other hand,
266. MOORE, supra note 264, § 132.02(2)(e), at 132-27 to -28.
267. See, e.g., Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987) (“[S]elective application of new
rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same.”).
268. See Tom Turner, The Saga of Mineral King, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 2, 2009),
http://www.hcn.org/wotr/the-saga-of-mineral-king; see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972). 
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the Supreme Court decided Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife nine days
after the six-year statute of limitations had expired.269 Sierra Club
received the relief it wanted and Defenders of Wildlife received
nothing, simply because the court system took different amounts of
time to decide the cases. Ironically, the Sierra Club appears to have
acted strategically when it limited its allegations of standing in an
effort to get the Supreme Court to articulate a very broad theory of
standing in environmental cases.270 The record does not suggest that
Defenders of Wildlife made a similar strategic choice. As a matter
of equity, a party that acts unintentionally should surely receive
more lenient treatment than a party that purposefully declines to
provide relevant facts to a court. 
The arbitrary nature of jurisdictional procedure may also create
perverse litigation incentives for plaintiffs. A plaintiff confident that
a court will resolve a jurisdictional issue before a statute of
limitations runs has the opportunity to secure a binding decision
about a hypothetical factual situation without negative repercus-
sion. Consider a hypothetical version of the Heartwood, Inc. v.
Agpaoa case. Imagine that the plaintiff organization hoped to secure
judicial approval for the proposition that a person has standing to
challenge anything that occurs in a national forest if she uses any
part of that forest. The organization files suit making such general
allegations. So long as the court decides whether those facts are
sufficient for jurisdiction within six years, the plaintiff will be able
to secure a judicial ruling on the organization’s theory of jurisdiction
and, even if the court dismisses the case, file a new lawsuit to
adjudicate the merits of her claim. While not technically an advisory
opinion beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts,271 this looks
very similar to one. Dismissal will formally terminate litigation, but
it will not resolve the legal rights of the parties in any meaningful
way because the suit can simply be renewed.  The court, in essence,
will have “declare[d] rights in [a] hypothetical case[ ].”272
269. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 555 (1992); Interagency
Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926 (June 3, 1986) (codified
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402). 
270. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735 n.8.
271. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
272. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000); see
also Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409 (1792).
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This risk is more than just a thought experiment. For example,
in Sierra Club v. Morton, the Sierra Club wanted to learn the
Supreme Court’s view of whether it could assert standing based
solely on its interest in the environment.273 Everyone knew that the
Sierra Club had additional—plainly sufficient—interests, but those
interests were excluded from the Club’s allegations.274 And when the
Supreme Court rendered a decision about a hypothetical state of
affairs,275 the Sierra Club simply advanced new allegations and
continued to pursue its claims.276
Jurisdictional procedure may also undermine our legal system by
creating a perception of unfairness. Studies have shown that
litigants see themselves as unfairly treated when courts resolve
cases based on issues that were not raised by the parties.277 As Lon
Fuller explained, “[I]f the grounds for the decision fall completely
outside the framework of the argument ... the adjudicative process
has become a sham, for the parties’ participation in the decision has
lost all meaning.”278 That feeling of unfairness can only be exacer-
bated when a court raises a jurisdictional issue at a time when the
factual record is closed. Parties are essentially sandbagged by the
court, precluded from furnishing the evidence necessary to pursue
their case because a district court overlooked a jurisdictional prob-
lem.
Litigating jurisdictional issues is complex and difficult because it
requires lawyers to foresee problems never identified by opposing
counsel, district courts, or—in the extreme—by any existing prec-
edent. As a result, parties with more experienced and skilled law-
273. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 729-31, 734-35 & n.8.
274. Compare  id., with Sierra Club, 348 F. Supp. 219, 220 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
275. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 741.
276. See Sierra Club, 348 F. Supp. at 219-20. The Supreme Court has cautioned that
parties should not be permitted to secure advisory opinions through artful pleadings. In U.S.
National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc., the Court
explained that it must determine whether a statute had been repealed, even though the
parties agreed that it had not, because to do otherwise “would permit litigants, by agreeing
on the legal issue presented, to extract the opinion of a court on hypothetical Acts of Congress
or dubious constitutional principles, an opinion that would be difficult to characterize as
anything but advisory.” 508 U.S. 439, 446-47 (1993); see also Eric D. Miller, Comment, Should
Courts Consider 18 USC § 3501 Sua Sponte?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1029, 1041 (1998).
277. See LANDSMAN, supra note 167, at 44-45; MARVELL, supra note 191, at 122.
278. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudiciation, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 388
(1978); see also LLEWELLYN, supra note 206, at 29.
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yers will fare better. Because experienced and skilled lawyers tend
to charge a higher fee, the pitfalls created by jurisdictional proce-
dure will fall more heavily on those with fewer resources.279 That
disparity is particularly troubling in the environmental context.
Environmental plaintiffs often lack the financial ability to hire
lawyers with extensive experience in federal court to represent their
effort to protect cherished natural resources.280 Moreover, industrial,
commercial, and government facilities that adversely affect public
health, quality of life, or aesthetics are often built in and around
communities with few financial means.281 While public interest
organizations sometimes champion the causes of those unable to
afford their own lawyers,282 the amount of free representation avail-
able is limited. That means that poorer plaintiffs are likely to be
disadvantaged by a system that requires their less experienced
lawyers to exercise the unfamiliar skill of preemptively papering the
record with evidence related to jurisdictional issues that may never
arise before a district court.283
2. Inaccuracy
Courts vindicate constitutional values when they ensure that they
do not decide cases that fall beyond their jurisdiction. Courts also
support the Constitution when they resolve cases over which they
have jurisdiction. Those two reciprocal obligations suggest that
courts should resolve jurisdictional questions based on “the facts as
they really exist.”284 Current judicial practice risks inaccurate
279. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 114 (1974). I do not mean to suggest that public
interest lawyers representing organizations or individuals and charging little or no fee do not
provide as good or better legal service than their highly paid counterparts at firms.
Organizations such as the Natural Resource Defense Counsel, Earth Justice, NAACP, Public
Citizen, and ACLU have highly talented and experienced litigators on staff. But these legal
resources are limited.
280. See Helen H. Kang, Pursuing Environmental Justice: Obstacles and Opportunities—
Lessons from the Field, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 121, 123-24 (2009).
281. See, e.g., Jeremy Linden, Note, At the Bus Depot: Can Administrative Complaints Help
Stalled Environmental Justice Plaintiffs?, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 170, 171-72 (2008).
282. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 280, at 123-24, 130-32; Linden, supra note 281, at 173.
283. Even the most experienced attorney may fall into a standing trap, particularly if an
appellate court announces a new rule in the course of dismissing her case. 
284. Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.S. 115, 120 (1898). Truth can, of course, be slippery and
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results because courts decide jurisdictional issues based on incom-
plete facts. 
The federal courts have long recognized an obligation to adjudi-
cate cases that fall within their jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court
explained in Cohens v. Virginia: “It is most true that this Court will
not take jurisdiction if it should not[;] but it is equally true, that it
must take jurisdiction if it should.”285 The courts must, therefore,
tread a careful path and ensure that they decide jurisdictional
questions correctly. Some courts exercise just such care. As dis-
cussed, the Seventh Circuit has directed parties to provide addi-
tional information regarding citizenship in an effort to correctly
determine the existence of diversity jurisdiction.286 Similarly, in the
context of petitions for review filed first in the court of appeals, the
D.C. Circuit has explained that it “retains [the] discretion to seek
supplemental submissions from [the] parties if it decides that more
information is necessary to determine whether petitioners, in fact,
have standing.”287 
The importance of courts rendering factually correct jurisdictional
decisions is even more apparent in the context of mootness. When
a case is moot, “Article III [of the Constitution] denies federal courts
the power to decide the case[ ].”288 Yet courts generally consider
mootness based on the facts presented by the parties. Courts do, on
occasion, inquire as to relevant facts, but courts are not obliged to
impossible to reconstruct. There are circumstances in which important values require
procedures acknowledged to make the discovery of truth more difficult, resulting in divergence
between judicially found facts and substantive, on-the-ground truth. See Robert S. Summers,
Formal Legal Truth and Substantive Truth in Judicial Fact-Finding—Their Justified
Divergence in Some Particular Cases, 18 LAW & PHIL. 497, 505-10 (1999). That this Article
suggests that jurisdiction should turn on the actual truth about jurisdictional facts does not
imply that a court will always be able to ascertain the objective facts necessary to accurately
determine jurisdiction. The point is, however, that current procedure is particularly
inaccurate in this regard.
285. 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821); see also New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
286. See, e.g., Am.’s Best Inns, Inc. v. Best Inns of Abilene, L.P., 980 F.2d 1072, 1073 (7th
Cir. 1992).
287. Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 401 F.3d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
288. Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964). For an explanation of the
exception to mootness for alleged violations capable of repetition but evading review, see
supra note 224 and accompanying text.
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investigate such facts and, as a result, may incorrectly retain or
abandon jurisdiction based on an incomplete factual record.
If courts do not concern themselves with whether they have
jurisdiction “in fact,” but rather consider only the record before the
district court, they are at a much greater risk of reaching an incor-
rect jurisdictional decision. Sierra Club v. Morton again provides a
clear example. The Sierra Club relied exclusively on the general
environmental interest of its members to assert standing, even as
amicus briefs before the Supreme Court noted that the Sierra Club
“has conducted regular camping trips into the Mineral King area,
and that various members of the Club have used and continue to
use the area for recreational purposes.”289 The Sierra Club did not
dispute those facts, but rather “declined” to rely on them,290 and the
Supreme Court held that the Sierra Club had failed to establish
standing.291
The courts of appeals have followed suit. In Friends of Tims Ford
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the Sixth Circuit considered a suit
brought by the owners of land bordering a reservoir against the
approval of a plan to increase the density of development around the
reservoir and permit the construction of additional community
docks.292 The owners alleged that boat traffic from existing commu-
nity docks impaired water quality and boater safety in waters
adjoining their property.293 The Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of
standing, finding that the harms associated with the existing docks
did not necessarily mean that new docks would injure the
plaintiffs.294 That decision pays scant attention to real world facts;
it is likely that, had the plaintiffs been given an opportunity to
supplement the factual record, they could have shown that increas-
ing the number of community docks was likely to increase the
amount of boat traffic on the reservoir, which, in turn, would likely
increase their injuries due to boat traffic. If the court had bothered
to inquire, it could almost certainly have found that such increased
289. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 n.8 (1972).
290. See id.
291. See id. at 741.
292. 585 F.3d 955, 960 (6th Cir. 2009).
293. Id. at 962.
294. Id. at 971.
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injuries were more likely than not the result of the planned
development.
Pollack v. U.S. Department of Justice raises the same concern. In
that case, an environmental organization sued the federal govern-
ment for operating a shooting range that discharged lead bullets
into Lake Michigan.295 One of the members of the organization,
Pollack, alleged that he was concerned about the effects of lead on
fish and wildlife in and around the lake.296 In holding that the plain-
tiffs lacked standing, the Seventh Circuit relied on two omissions
from Pollack’s declaration: First, the declaration stated that Pollack
was concerned about the effect of lead on freshwater fish; it noted
that he enjoyed eating such fish but did not specify whether he ate
fish from Lake Michigan.297 Second, Pollack explained that he en-
joyed observing birds around Lake Michigan but did not discuss
whether he visited the area immediately around the shooting range
to observe birds.298 Because Pollack lived only thirteen miles away,
it seems likely that, if asked, he would have reported that he
observed birds in the area of the shooting range. But the court did
not ask Pollack that question and its decision rendered him unable
to furnish the relevant information.299
3. Inefficiency
When courts dismiss cases based on omissions in the factual
record, they also waste the resources of both the judicial system and
the parties. By the time a case reaches the appellate stage, the court
system has invested substantial resources in resolving the merits of
the dispute. Dismissing a case on appeal based on jurisdictional
objections that could be answered by an expanded factual record
means that the parties will have to incur the expenses of a whole
new trial, should the plaintiff file a new lawsuit.300 
295. 577 F.3d 736, 737-38 (7th Cir. 2009).
296. Id. at 738.
297. Id. at 742.
298. Id. at 742-43.
299. Id.
300. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing
Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 327, 363 (1999). Of course, remanding
to the district court also imposes costs because it requires the district court judge to
reacquaint herself with the case. See id. at 362. When it comes to deciding factual issues,
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The inefficiency created by such revolving-door litigation is
manifold. From the perspective of the courts, a successor case may
end up on the docket of a new district court judge, requiring a
redundant investment of resources as the new judge familiarizes
herself with the parties, the facts, and the law. Even the same judge
will likely have to reacquaint herself with the facts and law if a new
suit is filed.301 A second appeal will impose similar costs on the court
of appeals.302 All of these effects are intensified in contexts, such as
environmental suits, in which the factual record tends to be lengthy,
dense, and heavily scientific in nature. 
Litigants, too, waste substantial resources when courts dismiss
a case only to have a new suit filed. Parties must draft new plead-
ings and motions, attend another round of status conferences, and
eventually prepare for and attend a new hearing. They may also
seek temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions,
multiplying their effort and expense. By essentially securing a redo
of the first case, parties can modify their litigation strategy to
respond to the earlier proceeding. Courts ordinarily require parties
to bring their claims at one time precisely to avoid such strategizing
and the attendant expense it causes.303
Delay imposes costs beyond the court and litigants. When a
plaintiff challenges allegedly illegal conduct, that conduct may
persist throughout the period of litigation. This can be a particular
problem in the environmental context. Consider an environmental
organization that has challenged a mining plan. While litigation
drags on, mining will likely occur, disturbing the natural landscape
and habitat it contains. That exacts an unjustifiable toll on the
environment if the mining plan is ultimately found to be illegal.
Such a situation also disadvantages the mining company because it
may well have to fund clean-up and restoration efforts in the wake
of a judicial decision invalidating its mining plan. Those costs will
only increase as time passes. The converse problem arises if in-
however, the district court has expertise; and besides, holding a hearing before one judge
consumes fewer resources—at least on a judge-hour basis—than holding a hearing before
three.
301. See id. at 329-30.
302. Even if judges remember a lot about a case’s earlier incarnation, their clerks may well
have turned over in the meantime. 
303. See Duane Reade, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 600 F.3d 190, 199 (2d Cir.
2010); United States v. Gammage, 580 F.3d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 2009).
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junctive relief delays a project that a court ultimately decides is
legal. The longer it takes to resolve a case, the greater the economic
effect on those relying on the authorized activity. 
Finally, delay may impair the accuracy of subsequent litigation.
Witnesses become harder to locate as time passes, and even when
they can be located, memories fade. In the worst case scenario, an
essential party may die just before a second trial, wasting all of the
efforts consumed by two rounds of litigation.304 
That jurisdiction is involved does not render these efficiency
concerns irrelevant. The Supreme Court has considered judicial
efficiency in construing the contours of its jurisdiction to review the
decisions of state courts and in assessing whether statutory ele-
ments are of a jurisdictional nature.305 It relied on judicial efficiency
to hold that a party’s consent to try a case before a magistrate judge
could be appropriately inferred.306 And it has limited the breadth of
the collateral order doctrine, which extends the jurisdiction of
appellate courts over nonfinal orders in limited circumstances, out
of concern for the costs faced by litigants.307 When a court adjudi-
cates a defense of qualified immunity, for example, the Supreme
Court has held that interlocutory appeal is available because the
doctrine provides a defense to having to withstand suit, not merely
a defense to liability. The justification is, in part, the desire to avoid
distraction of government officers from their job responsibilities.308
Scholarly analysis of jurisdiction has followed suit, considering
304. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., No. 06-1714, 2008
U.S. App. LEXIS 2854, at *9-10 (4th Cir. Feb. 7, 2008).
305. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513-14 (2006); Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S.
654, 660 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court has on occasion indicated that efficiency
may not appropriately be considered in deciding jurisdiction. See, e.g., Thermtron Prods., Inc.
v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 344 (1976) (“[A]n otherwise properly removed action may no
more be remanded because the district court considers itself too busy to try it than an action
properly filed in the federal court in the first instance may be dismissed or referred to state
courts for such reason.”).
306. Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 590 (2003). The Court explained: “Inferring consent
in these circumstances thus checks the risk of gamesmanship by depriving parties of the
luxury of waiting for the outcome before denying the magistrate judge’s authority. Judicial
efficiency is served; the Article III right is substantially honored.” Id.
307. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.,
511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994).
308. See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr., Essay, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional
Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 90 (1999); Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment:
An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 667-69 (2009).
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whether particular jurisdictional rules enhance or impair
efficiency.309 
IV. THE REFORM OF JURISDICTIONAL PROCEDURE 
What is to be done? Section II argued that the duty of jurisdic-
tional inquiry imposed by jurisdictional procedure serves as a
second-best mechanism to preserve separation of powers. As we
have seen, however, courts create all manner of problems when they
consider jurisdiction sua sponte without also investigating jurisdic-
tional facts. Moreover, the most prevalent manifestation of juris-
dictional procedure advances one aspect of separation of powers,
while ignoring another. The Constitution explicitly provides mech-
anisms by which the political branches can prevent each other from
usurping unconstitutional authority. The duty of jurisdictional
inquiry analogously constrains courts from acting outside of their
constitutional authority. The political branches also possess implicit
means of spurring each other to exercise their constitutional power.
Jurisdictional procedure often fails in that regard because courts
frequently make no effort to ensure that they exercise the full extent
of their constitutionally delegated authority in those cases brought
before them. 
This Article suggests a conceptually straightforward solution:
reform jurisdictional procedure so that the duty of jurisdictional
inquiry also includes investigation of jurisdictional facts. This
means that courts will bear the ultimate responsibility of assuring
themselves that the record contains adequate jurisdictional facts to
allow for a correct assessment of jurisdiction. Parties bring jurisdic-
tional issues to the attention of courts and provide their legal
analysis even though courts themselves have the responsibility of
raising and resolving those issues. In just the same way, parties
would continue to play a crucial role in providing courts with the
factual information necessary to resolve jurisdictional issues. This
procedure will increase the inquisitorialness of jurisdictional
309. See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason for It; It’s Just Our Policy: Why the
Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 597, 653-55 (1987) (considering and rejecting the argument that the well-
pleaded complaint rule enhances efficiency); Michael Wells, Who’s Afraid of Henry Hart?, 14
CONST. COMMENT., 175, 182-83 (1997).
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procedure, but not at great expense to the autonomy interests of
parties. Moreover, by investigating jurisdictional facts, courts can
better check themselves to assure that they exercise the power
delegated to them by the Constitution, but no more.310 
A. The Duty to Investigate Jurisdictional Facts
In our legal system we do not think of judges as investigators.
Instead, judges should remain above the fray so as to preserve their
neutrality.311 Even outside the judiciary, principles of administrative
law generally require agencies to separate the functions of investi-
gators and decision makers.312 But the courts’ existing obligation to
raise questions of jurisdiction means they have entered the inves-
tigatory field.313 Expanding that role to include the duty to investi-
gate the facts that will permit a correct determination of jurisdiction
does not, therefore, disturb an otherwise carefully calibrated adver-
sarial procedure.314 
Charging judges with factual investigation should not arouse
suspicion. The American legal system already condones such activ-
ity. For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence empower judges to
question witnesses and even call individuals to the stand whom they
believe possess knowledge relevant to a case,315 and district courts
may permit jurors to submit questions to witnesses as well.316
310. Commentators have argued that certain jurisdictional doctrines may create a sphere
within which the courts have discretion to decide whether to entertain a case. See, e.g.,
BICKEL, supra note 36, at 127-32; see also Dodson, supra note 5, at 1442-43 (discussing how
non-jurisdictional elements can affect whether cases are heard).
311. See, e.g., LANDSMAN, supra note 167, at 37 (contending that parties must remain in
control of the production of evidence “to preserve the neutrality of the fact finder”).
312. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2006) (“An employee or agent engaged in the performance of
investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually
related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review.”).
313. See, e.g., MARVELL, supra note 191, at 121 (“The adversary process is no more starkly
challenged than when a court decides an issue not raised, for it actually decides something
other than what the parties asked it to decide.”).
314. See LANDSMAN, supra note 167, at 2 (“The adversary process should not be viewed as
a single technique or collection of techniques; it is a unified concept that works by use of a
number of interconnecting procedures, each of real importance to the process as a whole.”).
As explained previously, scholars have argued that inquisitorial procedures could improve
many aspects of American law. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
315. FED. R. EVID. 614.
316. See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001, 1005 (1st Cir. 1992).
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Courts seek out scientific information they believe essential to the
proper resolution of cases and, when necessary, appoint experts to
provide them that information.317 Courts direct parties to enter
mediation programs in which court-assigned mediators solicit infor-
mation from the parties and attempt to broker deals,318 and they
grant special masters charged with implementing injunctions broad
authority to investigate.319 The practice of judicial notice also
involves investigation.320 In state court, probate proceedings321 and
grand jury proceedings322 both give judicial decision makers inves-
tigatory authority.323 Even courts of appeals sometimes engage in
independent fact finding.324 Most relevantly, the Supreme Court has
held that district courts may inquire into jurisdictional facts,
explaining that “it is within the trial court’s power to allow or to
require the plaintiff to supply, by amendment to the complaint or by
affidavits, further particularized allegations of fact deemed sup-
portive of plaintiff ’s standing.”325 Thus jurisdictional procedure
already bridges between leaving parties in exclusive control of their
cases and giving courts the authority to seek out the truth.326 The
317. See FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (“The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon
by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection.”); Marlow, supra note
213, at 306-07 (collecting cases).
318. See Kessler, supra note 17, at 1191.
319. Id. at 1194.
320. See FED. R. EVID. 201(b); Benjamin, supra note 300, at 350.
321. See, e.g., CHARLES J. GROPPE ET AL., 2 HARRIS 6TH NEW YORK ESTATES: PROBATE,
ADMINISTRATION, AND LITIGATION § 22:13 (6th ed. 2011).
322. See, e.g., 33 FLA. JUR. 2D Juries §§ 295-96 (2012); 64 OHIO JUR. 3D Jury §§ 129-133
(2012). A West Virginia court directly investigated the work of a forensic expert suspected of
misconduct. In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Policy Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438
S.E.2d 501, 502-05, 508 (W. Va. 1993); see also Roach, supra note 210, at 432 & n.221.
323. Other common law systems that largely adhere to adversarialism also permit judges
to exercise investigative powers in limited circumstances. In Australia, Canada, and England,
for example, judges are authorized to conduct inquiries into suspected wrongful convictions.
See Roach, supra note 210, at 430-31. 
324. See generally Gorod, supra note 198, at 25-37.
325. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (emphasis added); see also Wetmore v.
Rymer, 169 U.S. 115, 120 (1898); Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 401 F.3d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
326. Indeed, some have argued that the American legal system would benefit if it entrusted
judges with all factual investigation. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 169, at 824. Professor
Langbein’s article advocating reform of the American legal system based on German civil
procedure generated substantial controversy. Some commentators questioned the benefits
ascribed to the German system. See Allen et al., supra note 169, at 706. But see John H.
Langbein, Trashing The German Advantage, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 763, 764 & n.11 (1988). Others
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judicial system accepts whatever harm this imposes to individual
autonomy as a cost for more accurate, and thus more just, judicial
decisions.327
Experience suggests that the current practice of permitting judges
to exercise control and inquire into law and facts outside the four
corners of a case as presented by the parties has not corrupted the
objectivity of the American legal system or the faith that society
places in it. Even if placing judges in active control risks bias,
jurisdictional procedure already incorporates that risk because it
requires judges to do more than passively decide.328 
Moreover, the American legal tradition once entrusted the judi-
ciary with even greater responsibilities of investigation. As Amalia
Kessler established in her exhaustive treatment of the inquisitorial
tradition of American equity courts in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, prior to the merger of law and equity, federal
equity courts appointed masters 
to direct the necessary discovery, including ordering the parties
and/or witnesses to produce documents and to submit to
examination under oath. Thus, unlike what the common-law
jury had long since become, the master was not simply a passive
audience for whatever evidence the parties chose to present, but
instead played an active, inquisitorial role in determining what
evidence should be heard and which questions asked.329
The traditional equity framework provided minimal avenues for
parties to participate in collecting evidence by excluding parties
questioned the viability of reform due to American legal culture. See John C. Reitz, Why We
Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 IOWA L. REV. 987, 988
(1990). The argument presented here does not require adoption of a broader investigative role
for judges. Instead, it suggests only that judges should have a duty to investigate facts where
they have already adopted inquisitorial procedures related to the legal question of
jurisdiction. 
327. In responding to The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, John Reitz argues that
American legal culture would strenuously resist entrusting judges with a generalized
responsibility for fact finding. See Reitz, supra note 326, at 988.
328. The limited research available suggests that active engagement does not necessarily
create biased decision making. See Thibaut et al., supra note 178, at 396.
329. Kessler, supra note 17, at 1209 (footnotes omitted); see also FED. R. EQUITY 77 (1842),
in THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 59 (8th ed. 1933) (authorizing masters to “direct all other
inquiries and proceedings in the matter before him, which he may deem necessary and proper
to the justice and merits thereof and the rights of the parties”).
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from the room when masters received testimony and only permit-
ting parties to suggest questions that masters might choose to ask.
But times have changed and modern inquisitorial proceedings in the
United States and elsewhere permit both judges and parties to
participate actively in evidence gathering.330 
Thus, American courts already investigate facts and without
apparent negative repercussions. Extending the duty of jurisdic-
tional inquiry to require that judges investigate jurisdictional facts
before dismissing cases fits comfortably within the contours of the
American legal system. In practical terms, this extension would
require courts to recognize potential jurisdictional questions and
then gather evidence relevant to those questions. For example,
when a plaintiff alleges that a timber sale will harm her recre-
ational interests, a court should ask her if she uses the affected
area, rather than simply dismissing for lack of standing. When a
plaintiff challenges a forest plan without identifying a project
authorized by the plan, a court should ask whether delaying judicial
review would cause her hardship, rather than simply dismissing for
lack of ripeness. And when it appears that a case may be moot, a
court should seek out evidence as to whether allegedly illegal
conduct will recur. In each case, the court should satisfy itself that
it has enough information to rule on its jurisdiction rather than
relying upon the parties to do so.
Courts could investigate facts in a variety of ways. In some
circumstances, issuing to the parties an order seeking relevant
information will suffice. In others, when facts are contested or less
certain, the court may need to convene an evidentiary hearing at
which both the court and the parties could question witnesses.331
Alternately, a court could appoint a special master to gather evi-
330. See Wolfe & Proszek, supra note 178, at 295; see also Kessler, supra note 17, at 1261-
62 (describing the joint fact-finding role of parties and judges in the French system); Wolfe &
Proszek, supra note 178, at 297-98 (describing the fact-finding role of administrative law
judges). Because judges could inquire into jurisdictional facts in the presence of the parties,
such factual investigation would not run afoul of modern rules of judicial ethics. See, e.g.,
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9(A) (2011) (“A judge shall not initiate, permit, or
consider ex parte communications ... concerning a pending or impending matter.” (footnote
omitted)); Marlow, supra note 213, at 292-93. 
331. Such a practice already exists under American law. Administrative benefit
determinations utilize similar processes that charge the judge and the parties with joint
responsibility to develop the factual record. See Wolfe & Proszek, supra note 178, at 295. 
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dence and recommend findings of fact. When a scientifically dis-
putable question arises, courts may appoint independent experts to
provide them needed information and perspective.332 It is possible
that courts may even discover jurisdictional facts lurking in the
record that have gone unnoticed by the parties. That may be par-
ticularly likely when extensive administrative records are con-
cerned. For example, an environmental impact statement prepared
under the National Environmental Policy Act may contain ample
evidence that a government activity is likely to harm the aesthetic
or recreational interests of environmental plaintiffs, but the plaintiff
may not notice.333 
Investigating facts will often require only modest effort. In the
case of Sierra Club v. Morton, for example, a court could have
determined that the Sierra Club had standing by simply asking if
its members used the Mineral King Valley.334 The same goes for
Pollack v. U.S. Department of Justice. The court had to ask only if
the plaintiff observed birds in the area around the challenged
shooting range or ate fish from Lake Michigan.335 In such cases, the
task of formulating the appropriate question requires much less
energy than writing an order dismissing the case because of an
incomplete factual record. 
Friends of Tims Ford v. Tennessee Valley Authority, in which
plaintiffs challenged a plan to construct additional public docks, pre-
sents a more complex situation. While as a matter of intuition it
seems likely that more docks will lead to more boat traffic, and thus
increase plaintiffs’ injuries, that intuition masks technical questions
about future demand for public boating access and the relationship
between the number of boaters on the lake and harm to the plain-
tiffs. A court might rely on that intuition, order the parties to
332. See FED. R. EVID. 706.
333. As Amy Wildermuth and Lincoln Davies have explained, administrative records often
do not include facts relevant to a plaintiff ’s standing because the agency has no need to
consider that issue. Wildermuth & Davies, supra note 5, at 1001-02. When plaintiffs allege
personalized injuries related to environmental harms, however, administrative records may
yield relevant information. Under the National Environmental Policy Act, federal agencies
must assess the significant environmental effects of their activities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f
(2006). That information may validate the standing of those that use affected resources.
334. Indeed, briefs before the Supreme Court alleged as much. Instead of considering those
facts, however, the Supreme Court honored the Sierra Club’s decision to “decline[ ] to rely on
its individualized interest[ ] as a basis for standing.” 405 U.S. 727, 735 n.8 (1972).
335. See Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 577 F.3d 736, 742-43 (7th Cir. 2009).
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address the issue, or call upon an expert. The environmental impact
statement prepared by the Tennessee Valley Authority may also
have shed light on these questions if reviewed with a careful eye
because, presumably, it considered the environmental effects of
increasing the number of public docks.336 
Some litigation will pose thornier questions, such as lawsuits
related to climate change. For example, in Amigos Bravos v. U.S.
Bureau of Land Management, environmental organizations chal-
lenged the approval of oil and gas leases in New Mexico on the
grounds that the Bureau of Land Management had not adequately
considered that greenhouse gases associated with the project would
contribute to climate change.337 As a basis for standing, the organ-
izations relied primarily on claims that climate change generally,
which would be exacerbated by the project, would adversely affect
specific ecosystems in New Mexico enjoyed by their members.338 The
scientific question of what localized effects climate change will have
on specific ecosystems is complicated and debatable.339 
The Amigos Bravos case presents an added twist, because there
is reason to believe that the plaintiffs in the case limited their
claims of injury to those resulting from climate change in order to
secure judicial consideration of a theory that anyone affected by the
climate—that is, everyone—has standing to challenge any project
that contributes to climate change. The organizations declined to
allege that members use the areas directly affected by the oil and
gas leases at issue.340 I suspect, however, that the membership,
which consists of many New Mexico residents, does use those areas
and would have standing based on aesthetic and recreational
interests likely to be affected by oil and gas development. An inves-
tigation court could, therefore, dodge the scientific issues related to
336. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court adopted that approach, relying, in part,
on the administrative record complied by the EPA to determine that Massachusetts had
established injury in fact. 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007).
337. 816 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1122-23 (D.N.M. 2011).
338. Declaration of Joanie Berde at 5-6, Amigos Bravos, 816 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D.N.M.
2011) (No. 6:09-cv-00414-RB/LFG); Declaration of Anna Frazier at 3-4, Amigos Bravos, 816
F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D.N.M. 2011) (No. 6:09-cv-00414-RB/LFG); Declaration of Jeremy Nichols
at 7-9, Amigos Bravos, 816 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D.N.M. 2011) (No. 6:09-cv-00414-RB/LFG).
339. That is not to say that all claims related to climate change are debatable. The weight
of scientific evidence links changes in the climate to the release of greenhouse gases, and the
Supreme Court has already recognized as much. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523.
340. See Amigos Bravos, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 1122-23.
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climate change altogether by inquiring into this alternative and
more traditional avenue of standing. 
In practice, some courts already institute limited procedures to
collect information related to jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit, for
example, requires parties filing a petition for review to “set forth the
basis for the claim of standing ... [and] [w]hen ... standing is not
apparent from the administrative record, ... include arguments and
evidence establishing the claim of standing.”341 The court “retains
the discretion to seek supplemental submissions from the parties if
it decides that more information is necessary to determine whether
petitioners, in fact, have standing.”342 And the court has exercised
that discretion. In Public Citizen v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, the court considered a challenge to a regulation
based on an allegation that the agency should have adopted a more
stringent alternative that would have better protected public
health.343 In its initial decision, the court concluded that “the record
[was] incomplete” because it contained insufficient information to
determine whether the increased risk of harm associated with the
adopted regulation was sufficiently great to satisfy the injury in fact
requirement.344 Rather than dismissing for lack of standing, the
court ordered Public Citizen to
file affidavits ... addressing (i) whether [the regulation] as
adopted creates a substantial increase in the risk of death,
physical injury, or property loss over the interpretation ... that
Public Citizen has advanced, and (ii) whether the ultimate risk
of harm to which Public Citizen’s members are exposed ... is
“substantial” and sufficient “to take a suit out of the category of
the hypothetical.”345
341. D.C. CIR. R. 28(a)(7); see also Wildermuth & Davies, supra note 5, at 986-90.
342. Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 401 F.3d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
343. 489 F.3d 1279, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 2007), on further consideration 513 F.3d 234 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
344. Pub. Citizen, 489 F.3d at 1296.
345. Id. at 1297 (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 6 (2006)). Whether
the court imposed the correct burden on Public Citizen to demonstrate standing is beyond the
scope of this Article. See generally Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion? The Dangers of
Imposing a Standing Threshold, 97 GEO. L.J. 391, 394-95 (2009) (criticizing the substantial
increase of risk standing threshold). I am interested, instead, in the court’s decision to identify
and request the information it believed necessary to correctly rule on standing. 
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In response, both the federal agency and Public Citizen submitted
technical declarations discussing the public health risks related to
the case.346 The D.C. Circuit’s practice exemplifies the type of fact
investigation that courts can easily undertake. In doing so, courts
will more often correctly decide whether a case falls within their
jurisdiction. 
The American legal system currently does not oblige judges to
investigate facts related to jurisdiction. But it could. Courts already
possess the discretion to conduct such investigation and transform-
ing that discretion into duty does not run crosswise with the
existing traditions of the American legal system. 
B. Reposing the Duty in the District Court
When a district court identifies a jurisdictional issue, the district
court should also investigate the facts. Even when a court of appeals
recognizes jurisdictional issues overlooked by the district court, it
makes sense to charge district courts with the task of investigating.
When a district court fails to assure itself that the record contains
sufficient jurisdictional facts, the appellate court should reverse and
remand, as they already do on an ad hoc basis.347 
Obliging district courts to investigate jurisdictional facts also
recognizes that “[t]he trial judge’s major role is the determination
of fact[s], and with experience in fulfilling that role comes exper-
tise.”348 Simply put, district courts have the primary obligation to
find facts. Nothing may prohibit courts of appeals from finding facts
346. See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 513 F.3d 234, 238 (D.C.
Cir. 2008). For an excellent discussion of standing issues that arise in the context of petitions
for review, and the possible means that courts have for addressing disputed jurisdictional
facts when a case originates in the court of appeals, see generally Wildermuth & Davies,
supra note 5.
347. See Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714 (1986) (“If the Court of
Appeals believed that the District Court had failed to make findings of fact essential to a
proper resolution of [a] legal question, it should ... remand[ ] to the District Court to make
those findings.... [I]t should not simply have made factual findings on its own.”); Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291-92 (1982) (“When an appellate court discerns that a
district court has failed to make a finding because of an erroneous view of the law, the usual
rule is that there should be a remand for further proceedings to permit the trial court to make
the missing findings.”). But see Benjamin, supra note 300, at 334-35 (noting that the Supreme
Court often engages in appellate fact finding rather than remanding a case).
348. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).
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in appropriate circumstances.349 Only long-standing tradition pre-
cludes courts of appeals from directly taking evidence.350 Judges
practiced at presiding over oral arguments, however, may have little
experience or skill at eliciting factual information from witnesses.
There is no reason to require appellate judges to become practiced
at investigating facts when district court judges can serve that
role—indeed, such division of labor serves judicial efficiency.
Remanding to district courts also provides for orderly appellate
review. Parties have a right of appeal because we recognize the
value in having a second judicial body consider each case, guard
against bias in the judge below, and provide greater consistency to
the law.351 When courts of appeals find facts on their own, those
advantages evaporate. The Supreme Court offers a limited check
against incorrect court of appeals decisions, but the odds that the
Supreme Court will grant certiorari to correct an erroneous finding
of fact is infinitesimally small.352 Nor is it clear what standard of
review would govern Supreme Court review of appellate fact-
finding. When district courts find jurisdictional facts, on the other
hand, the familiar appellate process can unfold through ordinary
application of the clear error standard of review.353 
Appellate review can proceed when district courts explicitly find
jurisdictional facts. There may, of course, be situations when juris-
diction is so obvious that requiring findings of fact would constitute
a formalistic waste of judicial resources. Whenever questions about
jurisdiction arise, however, the courts of appeals will benefit from
349. For example, the Supreme Court permits de novo appellate review of certain
constitutional facts in the First Amendment context. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 508 n.27 (1984); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 229-30 (1985).
350. See Benjamin, supra note 300, at 353.
351. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (“The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction ... from
all final decisions of the district courts.”); see also Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 603, 607 (1985) (explaining that the “three-tiered, appeal-as-of-right system”
used in federal courts addresses corrective, consistency, and bias concerns).
352. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s rules do not contemplate granting certiorari to correct
such an error. See SUP. CT. R. 10.
353. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); Collins, supra note 133, at 1875. Clear error review, rather
than de novo review, applies even when district courts find jurisdictional facts at the
dismissal or summary judgment stage. See, e.g., Rio Grande Silvery Minnow (Hybognathus
Amarus) v. Bureau of Reclamation, 599 F.3d 1165, 1175 (10th Cir. 2010); Canadian Lumber
Trade Alliance v. United States, 517 F.3d 1319, 1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Valentin v. Hosp.
Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 365 (1st Cir. 2001).
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district court fact finding; when district courts fail to find such facts,
a limited remand is appropriate.354 Whether jurisdiction is reason-
ably called into question is, however, a matter of perspective, and
courts of appeals will need to develop standards to govern when
they will remand for fact finding. D.C. Circuit practice may serve as
a useful guide. As discussed, that court requires petitions for review
to address standing in which “the petitioner’s standing is not self-
evident.”355 
To consider the practical applications of this procedure, return
again to the Heartwood, Inc. v. Agpaoa case. Recall that Heartwood
provided standing affidavits alleging that its members used a
national forest, but did not specify whether they used those areas of
the forest subject to the proposed timber harvest. Under the
procedure I propose, if the case arrived in the court of appeals as it
did—including no findings of jurisdictional fact by the district
court—the Sixth Circuit would remand for further proceedings.
Suppose instead that the district court had addressed the declara-
tions in the initial proceeding, accepted the facts they contained as
true, and determined them sufficient to establish standing; the
Sixth Circuit could then reverse and remand, holding that the
district court had applied an improper legal standard. The district
court would then have the opportunity to conduct additional factual
investigation under the proper standard articulated by the court of
appeals. If, on the other hand, the district court had inferred from
the affidavits that the members used the project area, and made
such a finding of fact, the court of appeals would review only for
clear error. 
There are, of course, other options.356 Courts of appeals could
themselves fill gaps in the evidentiary record or they could appoint
special masters to do so. Recent scholarship has endorsed those
approaches for situations in which the need for fact finding becomes
apparent in proceedings before the courts of appeals. Amy
354. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., No. 06-1714, 2008
U.S. App. LEXIS 2854, at *23 (4th Cir. Feb. 7, 2008).
355. Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also Am. Library Ass’n v.
FCC, 401 F.3d 489, 490 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Both petitioners and the Commission reasonably,
if inaccurately, concluded that petitioners’ standing was self-evident .... [W]e have concluded
that more is required.”).
356. See Pidot, supra note 16, at 1417-19 (discussing avenues of reform).
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Wildermuth and Lincoln Davies suggest that courts of appeals
appoint special masters when they consider petitions for review
arising in the court of appeals and the record does not disclose
sufficient facts to determine if the petitioners have standing.357
Stuart Benjamin suggests that courts of appeals engage in direct
fact finding when facts relevant to the merits of a case change after
the district court entered judgment.358 
While Benjamin, Wildermuth, and Davies disfavor remand, their
objections do not apply in the context this Article considers.
Wildermuth and Davies address circumstances when a case
challenging action taken by an administrative agency arises in the
court of appeals. In that context, remanding to the district court is
not a viable option because the district court possesses no jurisdic-
tion over the case. Wildermuth and Davies do not believe that
appellate courts should remand to administrative agencies because
agencies are not disinterested in the question of whether petitioners
have standing to bring administrative law challenges and have no
expertise or business determining facts related to the jurisdiction of
federal courts.359 Instead, they suggest that courts of appeals
appoint special masters to find jurisdictional facts. There is sig-
nificant merit to their argument that such appointments prove
preferable to direct fact finding by appellate judges. But when
courts of appeals review district court decisions, a remand to the
district court does not raise the same problems. After all, courts of
appeals routinely remand when they conclude that district courts
have erred. 
Benjamin’s concerns also do not apply. He considers the need for
appellate courts to find facts when the merits of a case turn on a
rapidly changing situation. He worries that remanding risks an
“infinite remand loop” in which new facts will arise after each
district court ruling, which will then result in another remand.360
The facts related to jurisdiction do not typically experience such
rapid change over the course of a lawsuit. Most jurisdictional
questions focus on circumstances as they existed at the time that a
357. See Wildermuth & Davies, supra note 5, at 1003-07.
358. See Benjamin, supra note 300, at 311-12.
359. See Wildermuth & Davies, supra note 5, at 1001-02.
360. Benjamin, supra note 300, at 332.
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plaintiff filed suit;361 jurisdiction must exist then, and those his-
torical facts are static. Although mootness does rely on occurrences
subsequent to the commencement of litigation, the inquiry should
be unidirectional. Once a case has become moot, the court need not
consider any further development in the facts. 
Benjamin further opines that remanding wastes judicial re-
sources. He argues that a court of appeals must familiarize itself
with a case to determine if a remand is necessary. Remanding at
that point will waste the effort of the court of appeals, require the
district court to regain familiarity with the case, and if further
appeals arise, require yet more attention from the court of ap-
peals.362 The situation of jurisdiction should impose only minimal
costs of these kinds.363 Appellate courts do not need to become
familiar with the merits of a case to identify jurisdictional issues.
Indeed, such cases may be candidates for summary disposition when
the court of appeals notes a jurisdictional issue and issues a limited
remand to the district court.364 
C. Potential Pitfalls and Alternatives
I envision three types of primary criticisms of my proposal, one
practical, one theoretical, and one financial. In addition, there are
at least three alternatives to the new jurisdictional procedure that
I have suggested that would accomplish some of its goals. I discuss
each of these in turn. 
Practically speaking, a skeptic might argue that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Summers v. Earth Island Institute forecloses
implementing the duty of jurisdictional inquiry in the way that I
propose. The Summers Court refused to consider standing declara-
tions submitted to the court of appeals, explaining that “[i]f [the
361. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830 (1989).
362. Benjamin, supra note 300, at 361-63.
363. Cases will arise in which an appellate court could easily ascertain the facts necessary
to establish jurisdiction and, in such circumstances, a remand rule would seem inefficient. But
a requirement of remand will save courts the effort of discerning these circumstances. More
importantly, requiring remand will enhance the legitimacy of judicial proceedings and curtail
perception that courts of appeals manipulate jurisdiction to achieve ideological ends. See, e.g.,
Pierce, supra note 30, at 1759-60.
364. See, e.g., DAVID G. KNIBB, FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS MANUAL § 25:4, at 589-90 (5th
ed.). 
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plaintiffs] had not met the challenge to their standing at the time of
judgment, they could not remedy the defect retroactively.”365 That
logic might suggest that the court of appeals must resolve jurisdic-
tional questions, or at least standing questions, based on the record
at the time that the district court first entered judgment. The Court,
however, did not consider whether a court of appeals can remand to
allow the district court to further develop the record. Narrowly
speaking, therefore, Summers does not undermine my approach.366
I also think it possible that the Supreme Court’s decision was
motivated by a concern that courts of appeals should not enter the
fact-finding business whenever the district court record is incom-
plete, a concern that complements, rather than contradicts, my
conclusions here. That consideration suggests that current juris-
dictional procedure has substantial room for development and
refinement; nothing the Supreme Court has said precludes a pro-
cedure that maintains the district court’s responsibility for develop-
ing the factual record, but allows remand when the record is
incomplete.
From a theoretical perspective, a skeptic might contend that
investigating jurisdictional facts exceeds the courts’ competence and
entrusts too much authority to the district judge. Judges are not
trained as investigators. Nor are judges scientists, and in some
circumstances jurisdictional fact finding requires investigation and
resolution of highly technical issues. In Amigos Bravos v. Bureau of
Land Management, for example, it could be argued that the district
court lacked the requisite knowledge and skill to determine whether
it was more likely than not that climate change would degrade those
ecosystems enjoyed by the plaintiffs. Similarly, under the system
proposed in this Article, district judges could initiate burdensome
procedures to unnecessarily identify facts based on a misunder-
standing of the legal standard. Parties faced with such a burden-
some process, perhaps requiring them to disclose personal, privi-
365. 555 U.S. 488, 495 n.* (2009); see also FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 235
(1990) (explaining that the post-judgment affidavit was not part of the record, but then
explaining that it was insufficient evidence to show standing).
366. The Supreme Court has not explained how its ruling in Summers relates to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1653 (2006), which provides that “[d]efective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended,
upon terms, in the trial or appellate courts.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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leged, or proprietary information, might have no choice but to
voluntarily dismiss or settle.
These related objections, however, run counter to the broad
responsibilities that our legal system entrusts to judges. Judges
already engage in factual and legal investigation in a variety of
contexts. We trust them to serve as investigators when the need
arises, and we should do so when it comes to jurisdictional facts.
District court judges already have broad discretion to define the
scope of discovery. Appellate courts can curb district judges re-
quiring unusual, extreme, and unnecessary fact investigation
through the mandamus process.367 Moreover, objections based on the
competence of the courts to resolve scientific issues do not directly
challenge the ability of courts to investigate those issues. Current
jurisdictional doctrine—particularly standing—already requires
courts to assess and resolve scientific disputes. This Article merely
proposes that courts should seek out more information so that they
can make better decisions on matters in which they must act
independently of the parties. 
From a financial perspective, a skeptic might challenge my
proposal as improperly shifting litigation costs from the parties to
the public. Investigating jurisdictional facts will often be easy, but
at times it may require sustained attention by a district court and
could even involve appointment of technical or scientific experts. It
may be possible to shift those costs back to the parties, even if the
courts head up the investigation. Even if that proves impracticable,
I believe that more fully vindicating separation of powers principles,
more fairly treating parties, and arriving at more just results, is
worth the cost. My proposal may also have the worthy benefit of
counteracting perceptions of illegitimacy that currently surround
decisions about jurisdiction, and in particular, dismissals for lack of
standing. Commentators have long speculated that appellate courts
invoke standing on ideological grounds to avoid deciding cases that
they do not like.368 Empirical evidence provides some support for
that charge. In a study of Supreme Court and courts of appeals’
standing decisions, Richard Pierce, Jr. found a highly significant
correlation between the votes of judges and their political affil-
367. See Holt-Orsted v. City of Dickson, 641 F.3d 230, 236 (6th Cir. 2011).
368. See, e.g., Fleisher, supra note 31, at 924; Nichol, supra note 30, at 326.
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iation.369 The malleable legal standards that define standing may
present too tempting a target for judges seeking to avoid deciding
cases in a manner counter to their preferences. If so, shifting the
locus of jurisdictional decision making from the courts of appeals to
the district court may temper that temptation. Courts of appeals
will be unable to permanently terminate cases for lack of standing
except in the exceptional case. Instead, they will correct any legal
error committed below and then remand for the district court to
take evidence, find facts, and apply the correct legal rule. Whether
a particular plaintiff has standing will generally turn on those
findings of fact, and the court of appeals will review those findings
for clear error. 
Even if these pitfalls are surmountable, requiring courts to
investigate jurisdictional facts may seem like unnecessarily radical
surgery. Other possibilities could meet some of the goals of this new
jurisdictional procedure, while seemingly requiring more insignifi-
cant changes. 
Jurisdictional procedure could become wholly adversarial, re-
quiring defendants to raise subject matter jurisdiction defenses
just as they must raise other defenses. The American Law Institute
proposed such reform in a 1969 report focusing on concerns that
defendants losing before a federal district court could strate-
gically raise new challenges to diversity jurisdiction on appeal.370
Attempting to reform jurisdictional procedure in this way would
make it fairer, but the attempt would face considerable obstacles.
Modern procedures grew out of the Judiciary Act of 1875 and were
once statutory in character.371 But the courts now view themselves
as constitutionally bound to consider jurisdiction, making reform of
this sort difficult. I also believe that recasting jurisdictional pro-
cedure as an adversarial process would be a mistake. Federal courts
have assumed an increasingly important position in our separation
of powers in the centuries since the framing of the Constitution.
Judicial review has broadened, and judicial supremacy now
reigns.372 Today, federal courts exercise unparalleled authority to
369. Pierce, supra note 30, at 1759-60.
370. See THE AM. LAW INST., supra note 152, 366-69; see also Dobbs, supra note 152, at 525-
26 (opining that the proposed reform does not go far enough).
371. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
372. See KRAMER, supra note 96, at 77-78.
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police the other branches of the federal government. Because they
have the final say about the meaning of the Constitution and federal
statutes, federal courts largely operate beyond the kinds of external
checks and balances that the Constitution places on the President
and Congress.373 Jurisdictional procedure fills this gap, creating an
important internal constraint on judicial authority, and preventing
courts from “intrud[ing] into areas committed to the other branches
of government.”374 
Jurisdictional procedure could also include a rule that tolled the
statute of limitations during the pendency of a case. This would
allow all plaintiffs to attempt to renew suit based on new allegations
of jurisdictional fact, rather than having that opportunity turn on
the amount of time that it takes courts to dismiss. This reform
would also address issues of fairness by allowing all plaintiffs an
opportunity to cure jurisdictional defects in successive litigation. In
increasing the fairness of jurisdictional procedure, however, its
efficiency would markedly suffer. Moreover, modifying tolling rules
could face substantial doctrinal hurdles. In at least some circum-
stances, the Supreme Court has held that statutes of limitation are
themselves jurisdictional,375 which would seem to make a tolling
regime impermissible. Furthermore tolling would not address the
separation of powers concerns that adhere to courts dismissing
cases that fall within their jurisdiction.
Finally, jurisdictional procedure could include a rule that
appellate courts—including the Supreme Court—should remand,
rather than decide jurisdictional questions themselves. If questions
of standing return to trial judges, then parties could supplement the
record to try to meet the legal standard identified on appeal. This
too would serve fairness and enhance efficiency and accuracy. Even
a remand rule, however, would not create a self-checking mecha-
nism to ensure that courts “exercise the jurisdiction given to
them.”376 Rather, it would maintain the existing asymmetry in
which courts protect against overreaching, but do not ensure that
they fulfill their constitutional responsibilities. Vesting courts with
373. See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
374. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
375. See, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-34 (2008).
376. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
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the power and obligation to assure themselves of jurisdiction by
investigating both law and facts can best accomplish this purpose. 
CONCLUSION
Courts address jurisdictional issues through jurisdictional
procedure. Yet this area of the law has remained unidentified and
undertheorized, despite its marked departure from the ordinary
course of business in America’s adversarial legal system. This
departure is important because it vindicates constitutional princi-
ples of separation of powers. Current jurisdictional procedure does
so imperfectly, however, because courts do not see themselves as
obligated to investigate jurisdictional facts. Recognizing such an
obligation will ensure that federal courts exercise the full extent of
their jurisdiction, but no more. It would also cure serious ills arising
out of current jurisdictional procedure, which can result in the
dismissal of a case based on an issue never raised by the parties,
never raised by the district court, and for which the plaintiff is
never afforded an opportunity to present evidence. 
